ON THE EXISTENCE OF BRUNO LATOUR'S MODES by Blake, Terence
ON THE EXISTENCE OF BRUNO LATOUR’S MODES:
FROM PLURALIST ONTOLOGY TO ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM
by Terence Blake
Abstract: In this article I take a critical look at the origins 
and sources of Bruno Latour's pluralism as it is expressed in his 
book AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE, and compare it to other 
similar projects (Wittgenstein, Feyerabend, Badiou). I consider 
the accusations of reductionism and of relativism, and demonstrate
that Latour's «empirical metaphysics» is not an ontological 
reductionism but a pluralist ontology recognising the existence of
a plurality of entities and of types of entities. Nor is it an 
epistemological relativism but an ontological pluralism affirming 
the existence of a plurality of types of existence. These two 
strands, pluralist ontology and ontological pluralism, mutually 
reinforce each other to produce at least the outlines of a robust 
pluralist realism. 
FOREWORD:  CRITIQUE AND DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY AND ALLUSION
“Where do you criticize from? Don’t you see that criticizing is 
still knowing, knowing better? That the critical relation still 
falls within the sphere of knowledge. of “realization” and thus of
the assumption of power? Critique must be drifted out of. Better 
still: Drifting is in itself the end of all critique. The desire 
underlying and informing institutions composes set-ups which are 
energetic investments in the body, in language.” (Lyotard, 1972, 
cited from DRIFTWORKS, Semiotext(e), 1984).
“Lawrence criticised French literature for being incurably 
intellectual, ideological and idealist, essentially critical, 
critical of life rather than creative of life... We can only 
assemble among assemblages” (Deleuze and Parnet, DIALOGUES, 49-50 
& 53, published in French in 1977).
I read Latour with many French texts resonating in my mind, texts 
from the period just before and just after May ’68. There are many
such texts dating from this epoch and later that seem to have 
formed the pre-individual conceptual soup from which Latour draws 
to elaborate his own process of intellectual individuation. One 
line of argument in those texts was the critique of “critique” as 
the triumph of negativity and conformism disguised as lucidity, of
intellectual laziness disguised as sophistication, of meta-
discourse and abstraction disguised as perspicuity. Critique was 
said to be the new avatar of transcendence, a way to avoid 
engaging with life and concrete experience. Critical thought, 
though necessary, was seen as insufficient, and potentially 
destructive of thought and life if given primacy. What was needed 
was creative life, seen as an empirical concrete art of 
composition and assemblage.
It is interesting to note that Paul Feyerabend was talking in much
the same vein at roughly the same time, criticizing Popper’s 
critical rationalism for the primacy it gave to critique. An 
important difference was that Feyerabend did not limit his 
discussion to the shortcomings of various academic accounts of the
practice of science. He was willing to pose the general question 
of the nature and value of science. Latour affirms that properly 
understood his analyses do not undermine science but explain why 
it is as reliable as it is. What he undermines, or so he says, is 
a persistent deformation, a phantasm concerning the nature and 
function of science. This is only half true. His idea is that 
critique has become so democratised that anyone can apply its 
techniques to cast doubt on solid science, such as evolutionary 
biology or the study of climate change, in favour of positions 
that have no real research behind them (creationism, climate 
denialism) and whose defence reposes on just these critical 
techniques and nothing else. While I globally agree, I think 
questioning of the critical attitude goes too far and brands more 
general critical examination of the sciences as irrational. 
Latour’s thesis is not new, Feyerabend (who Latour never seems to 
refer to, preferring to imply that he was not influenced by the 
illustrious epistemological predecessors of science studies) 
declared that his aim was not to make critique easier but a lot 
more difficult. Yet he also maintained that more general questions
on the cognitive status and on the value of scientific results are
a necessary part of a democratic education and of an elightened 
participation in society.
Latour’s works emerge from this creative context of ideas, that we
may group together under the rubric of “post-structuralism”, or 
more generally of epistemological and ontological pluralism. Yet 
he does not easily acknowledge this source, except in the vaguest 
terms. Words, concepts, images that he seems to present as his own
derive from this background. The question one can pose is why does
he not fully acknowledge his immediate predecessors. On his own 
theory of mediation this influence is both inevitable and 
desirable, for to “multiply the mediators” is supposed to 
strengthen a position rather than weaken it. Sometimes I think 
that Latour is a Machiavellic master manipulator, a cunning 
diplomat deploying a rhetorical strategy to become the stereotype 
of the Great French Philosopher; sometimes I think that he is a 
master of the allusiveness that is necessary to enrich one’s style
with enough transindividual vibrancy to really be able to say 
something both contentful and new. 
I do not know how to resolve my dilemma, which comes from having 
read many texts that he has surely read and hearing their 
resonances in his own words. This impression of “déjà vu” combines
with other worries about the explicit content of his views that I 
find I both approve and feel dissatisfied with, that I summarise 
by saying “he’s on the right track, but he doesn’t go far enough”.
In many ways I find Bruno Latour’s system is an advance on Alain 
Badiou’s philosophy with its four truth procedures, where Latour 
discerns fifteen modes of veridiction, which are also modes of 
existence. Yet behind the talk of an open plurality of truth-
régimes and their specific mediations and institutions there are 
signs of conceptual and institutional conservatism and of 
authoritarian legitimation of the status quo.
I share Latour’s desire for philosophers to indulge in more 
“empirical research”, conceived broadly. My concern is that 
sometimes he slides between this more general sense of empiricism,
where a philosopher like Deleuze can be considered to do 
(conceptual, affective, perceptual, political, and even religious)
empirical fieldwork and a more limited sense in which Latour has 
done fieldwork but not Deleuze, nor Badiou, Lyotard and Serres. My
quarrel is with the diplomatic caricature of himself that Latour 
secretes, consciously or not, and that interferes with the part of
his message that I like and wish to help publicise.
ON ACADEMIC REGRESSION IN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
We are living through a period of intellectual regression in the 
realm of Continental Philosophy, a regression that proclaims 
itself to be a decisive progress beyond the merely negative and 
critical philosophies of the recent past. Yet the philosophies of 
Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard cannot be summed up in the 
image of pure critique. Their critical dissolution of the dogmatic
residues contained in even the most innovative philosophies they 
had encountered did not leave us in a powerless void of negativity
and paralysis. Their “deconstruction” went all the way down, 
deconstructing even the notion of critique and liberating the 
possibility of new assemblages and new processes of 
subjectivation.
Despite his insinuations to the contrary, Bruno Latour’s 
compositionism is the direct application of post-structuralist  
thought, that he is very familiar with. His talk, containing 
overtones of scientistic bravado, about his “empirical” research 
is very misleading, as his system is parasitic on these 
philosophical predecessors. He is however a good populariser of 
difficult ideas, and his work should be encouraged as long as we 
do not accept his own contextualisation of his research. Latour is
very much an inheritor of Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida and Serres and
the intellectual contemporary of Laruelle and Stiegler. It is his 
continuation of this pluralist lineage that gives his work its 
superiority over Badiou’s system, not any primacy of the empirical
over the philosophical.
Beyond the critique of the new figures of transcendence and 
ontotheology these thinkers gave concrete sketches of how to see 
the world in terms of a very different sort of ontology based on 
immanence – a pluralist diachronic ontology. The recent promotion 
of philosophical successors to this constellation of thinkers of 
immanence, such as Badiou and Zizek, has not led to any real 
progress but to a labour of travestying the past (one has only to 
look at  Badiou’s DELEUZE and Zizek’s ORGANS WITHOUT BODIES) and 
to a return to such intellectual deadends as Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (especially understood synchronically, as Badiou 
understands everything, as a speculative system). But even these 
regressive philosophers remain in dialogue, however one-sided and 
unjust, with their illustrious predecessors, and strive to 
confront them at the level of conceptual richness that 
characterised their work.
The next step was to keep up the general aura of having “gone 
beyond” the older supposedly negative thinkers but to radically 
simplify the conceptual level, presenting easy summary 
presentations of the new thought while conveniently forgetting the
conceptual paths followed. This step was taken by the epigoni: 
Meillassoux, who still retains an elevated style and at least an 
intention of conceptual rigour; and its pop variant in Graham 
Harman’s adaptation for the masses. For example, in THE THIRD 
TABLE Graham Harman gives a popularised version his theoretical 
position in the form of a flawed reading of, and an unsatisfying 
response to, Sir Arthur Eddington’s famous paradox of the two 
tables. Unfortunately, Harman shows himself incapable of grasping 
the anti-reductionistic import of Eddington’s argument and 
proposes an abstract philosophical dualism to replace Eddington’s 
pluralist vision of scientific research. Harman claims that his 
account escapes the reductionism that he mistakenly attributes to 
Eddington’s view, despite reducing the objects of common sense, 
science, and the humanities to the status of “utter shams”. It is 
implied that the theoretical justification for this unsatisfying 
presentation is to be found elsewhere in Harman’s works, but this 
is not the case.
However, it is Badiou’s philosophy that expresses in its purest 
and most general form the new paradigm that articulates explicitly
what is elsewhere just blithely presupposed as a form of thought 
too evident to even be aware of. The next step in consolidating 
the regression that Badiou’s philosophy, however innovative, 
represents (a regression that Badiou’s thought does not initiate 
but rather registers and legitimates) corresponds to the far less 
ambitious productions of the object-oriented ontologists. I say 
far less “ambitious” in the sense of conceptual ambition, because 
their ambition is if possible even greater than that of Badiou, 
but it is of a different order than the conceptual. They are the 
marketised version of the Badiou-Zizek constellation, and so the 
extremely politicised tone has been discreetly dissolved to leave 
a more demagogic packaging to the stale ideas that OOO trumpets 
ambitiously as the new construction after so much critique. The 
attempts by this new generation of phiosophers to elaborate a 
thought capable of guiding us in the new historical conjuncture 
that we are entering without being able to produce the concepts 
necessary to describe it are far from original.  Faced with the 
inadequacy of these variants of Badiou’s ontological hypothesis 
Mehdi Belhaj Kacem describes the need for a “new conjecture”. He 
examines various attempts to go beyond the metaphysical 
problematic secreted unconsciously by the trend towards 
speculative capitalism, of which Badiou’s metaphysics is the 
explicitation and the most accomplished form. MBK envisions such 
movements as Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology as 
containing nothing new capable of leading us out of the Badiousian
predicament.
It is normal that in this context François Laruelle’s philosophy 
is at last coming into its own. It could not attain full 
visibility and be understood on its own terms while the work of 
Deleuze and Derrida were in progress, as his critiques of that 
work were only half-true, based on giving it an ultimately 
uncharitable reading as remaining within the norms of sufficient 
philosophy, but other readings are possible. This was not the 
appropriate background to show up the singularity and the 
penetration of his ideas. Laruelle pursued over the decades his 
unwavering commitment to immanence, and this project shines forth 
now against the background of the regression that Badiou-Zizek-
Meillassoux and the OOOxians represent.
Paul Feyerabend gives us a sketch of a different sort of ontology 
than that of the Badiou-Zizek-epigoni carrousel, an ontology that 
is itself subject to the process of research instead of lording it
over the sciences, the arts, love, and political struggle. Bruno 
Latour goes in this direction, that of a diachronic ontology, and 
expresses the fairly obvious demand that religion be included 
among the various “truth-procedures” or modes of existence that 
are also, as Mehdi Belhaj Kacem points out, modes of “prehension” 
(using Whitehead’s term). François Laruelle made use of science to
rid philosophy of its synchronic pretentions, and has now opened 
philosophy onto the whole field of prehensions, including religion
(gnosticism and mysticism), art (photography), literature 
(science-fiction), politics (democracy), psychoanalysis (non-
analysis). Bernard Stiegler underlines the catastrophe visible 
inside Plato’s own works of the replacement of the preceding 
traditional diachronic cosmology by a new tyranny of thought and 
action based on the establishment of a synchronic ontology.
I make use of the Feyerabendian concept of abundance to resume the
features of a diachronic ontology that makes a place for realism 
AND historicity, for speculation AND revisability. “Withdrawal” is
an artefact, the pessimistic consequence of employing a simplified
set of abstractions to describe the different modes of existence, 
spatialising them and so producing and promoting a synchronic 
ontology which can neither account for change nor even do justice 
to the many elements and aspects of the world. Feyerabend 
distinguished the way of the scientist, or more generally the way 
of research, from the way of the philosopher. Consequently he was 
very wary of academic philosophy, its abstractions, its jargon, 
and its dualisms. This led him to be very attentive to the life of
the ordinary person and to defend common sense reality from 
academic philosophers who would teach us that the abundance of the
concrete world is an illusion, a “sham”, and that only their 
philosophical abstractions are real.
All this talk about diachronic ontology and processes of 
individuation raises the question of non-academic prehensions of 
the world, that we may summarize following Feyerabend and Laruelle
under the term “gnosis”. How much gnosis does one actually see in 
academic talk about gnosticism? Paul Feyerabend praised the 
gnostics for being able to put into question not just aspects of 
the world but also criticise in their globality both our 
understanding of the world and also the world itself. Feyerabend’s
whole thought from his anarchism, his defence of counter-
induction, to his sketches of an ontology capable of underwriting 
his pluralist methodology and politics of democratic relativism, 
bears the mark of his affinities with Gnosticism. If Gnosticism is
the opposite of an external doctrine to be administered by a 
hierarchical institution based on ontological stupidity and 
blindness (as much of the academy has become) then it is to be put
more in relation with processes of psychic and collective 
individuation (as Jung has argued). Feyerabend’s style embodies 
“gnosis” in this sense, and one would wish to see , for example, 
talk of the hermetic Deleuze be itself more hermetic (gnostic, 
diachronic, individuating) and less academic (dogmatic, 
synchronic, alienating).
The question then is not to be in the academy or not. There is no 
right place to be, as Lyotard remarked, just a right way of being:
a good conductor of intensities whether inside or outside the 
academy. We cannot say that artists exemplify a creativity that is
lacking in academic philosophy. Even philosophy professors can be 
non-philosophers, or better non-standard philosophers, innovating 
outside the conceptual hegemonies imposed by tradition. Even 
artists can be careerist pimps. There is no absolute criterion, 
and even our vocabulary can betray our thought. I would like to 
talk in terms of non-academics and ask “Does your path of energies
take you closer to the sources of immanence?” I would like to 
talk, as Laruelle does, of “thought-power” on the analogy with 
labour-power, but all that is academic jargon if it is not tied to
the lived experience it tries to convey. Feyerabend, a university 
professor, condemned the academy, its language and its cliques. He
did not talk or teach or think like the vast majority of his 
colleagues. Yet he claimed to have always had “complete freedom” 
to do things his way. Being in the academy or not administratively
speaking is not the criterion. But being inside the collective 
phantasm that it secretes and sustains, and voluntarily 
perpetuating that phantasm or doing something else is a criterion
HOW TO READ LATOUR (1): Polytheism of Values
One cannot help noticing a certain vagueness and conceptual 
tension in Latour’s use of the term “Moderns”, and of what role 
his appeal to a notion of “values” plays in his project: 
preliminary survey to open up the field of inquiry or rhetorical 
reduction to serve the purposes of his own agenda. The question is
thus posed of how we may best read this book, and Latour’s work in
general.
Style and vocabulary are important to Latour’s message, as are 
argumentative and rhetorical strategy. This implies that we do not
read Latour through the literalism and the narrow rationalism of 
“double-click” spectacles. Double-click is the name for a mode (of
discourse and of existence) that reduces existence to information 
treated as unmediated and transparent access to reality. In 
opposition to the claim of double-click rationality to be the only
trustworthy access to reality, since it takes itself to be the 
only mode of existence, Latour argues that there are in fact many 
modes of existence. Each of these modes generates its own 
information and subjects it to multiple transformations, and each 
embodies different values. The rise to hegemony of double-click 
rationality corresponds to what Max Weber called the process of 
rationalization, which brought with it the reduction of the many 
modes of existence to one, and thus the “disenchantement” of the 
world.
(Note: Latour lays out fifteen modes of existence and of 
“veridiction”, but unlike Badiou and his magic number of four 
“truth-procedures” Latour is open to the possibility of adding 
others. In this regard we can see Badiou as still practicing a 
priori philosophy, where Latour true to his word is intent on 
practicing an empirical metaphysics).
One can note that Latour’s choice of theoretical vocabulary is 
voluntarily simple, and one motive for this choice is the desire 
to avoid the misleading associations and connotations that adhere 
to the more technical words of the philosophical tradition. 
However, I agree with Deleuze that it is often the books that make
the choice of a non-technical vocabulary that are the most 
difficult. We have seen in the last post that Latour’s use of the 
word “modern” conceals many problems, as does his choice of the 
word “values”, and I have argued that his text on his own account 
must not be taken at face-value (“face-value) is another name for 
double-click, the omnipresent enemy of the recognition of the 
plurality of modes).
I think that this creates a situation that is a challenge for any 
consequent pluralism. Latour’s book is written not as just a 
monist double-click treatise about a pluralism of modes of 
existence but as itself an enactment of such pluralism, and is to 
be read accordingly. Its aim is, after the double-click 
disenchantment of the world, to reenchant the world by investing 
it with a polytheism of values. It requires that we read it with 
polytheistic awareness. Certainly we can and must read it for 
information, but we must also be awake to its strategies and 
conjunctural alliances. We must appreciate its fictioning of 
beings and of conceptual personae, and we must approach it with 
religious care to respond to the living spirit underlying its 
potentially dead letter. We must relate to it in terms of the 
psychic construction, or individuation, that it exemplifies and 
renders possible.
This polytheism of reading is in line with my own approach to 
understanding and interpretation. I personally don’t believe in 
direct access to a text (or to anything else), nor does Latour. I 
read a text with everything I’ve got. Certainly it is important to
take note of the vocabulary and of the distinctions foregrounded 
by the author, but I argue that they must be read against this 
polytheistic background.
HOW TO READ LATOUR (2): Against Straight Reading
We are often confronted with the demand that we read a writer 
“first” in their own terms, and then in a later phase propose 
hypotheses for interpreting the text. This is a naïve empiricist 
methodological principle based on the idea that we must first seek
direct unmediated “raw” data, and then elaborate hypotheses to 
explain that data. This principle is based on an impossibility, 
the myth of information untransformed by theoretical 
interpretation, and is in no way applicable to the process of 
research. Latour himself condemns it under the name of “Double 
Click”, the myth of transport of information without 
transformation. This is a basic principle of Latour’s research 
from the very beginning – we have only to recall that Latour 
started out in Biblical exegesis.
There is no “blank-slate” reading, just registering what Latour 
says in his own terms. Can we then read Latour with constant 
reference to the known facts concerning the domains he discusses? 
This would be yet another positivist reduction of his text, as 
Latour does not claim to be giving a report on the results of 
empirical research: “it is not in the mode of knowledge that I 
claim to be working” (AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE, 481). 
Latour’s text is not an exercise in “speaking straight” (Double-
Click), but in “speaking well” (plurimodal diplomacy). As such it 
requires something other than “reading straight”: a plurimodal or 
polytheist reading.
Latour calls the approach employed in his text “plurimodal”, 
“diplomatic”, or “relationist”. His text is constructed on the 
fable of an anthropologist who wishes to reconstitute the value 
system of modern Western societies. She is careful to avoid the 
naïve error of “believing what the West says about itself” (28), 
taking a truly anthropological approach, understanding that 
“modernism’s accounts of itself may have no relation to what has 
actually happened to it” (28). Her investigation involves living 
among her informants and participating in their daily activities 
without being credulous. She understands that this is the only way
to discover the value system of her informants, “who account for 
this system in terms to which she must avoid giving too much 
weight”.
The “surprising” discovery of this fictitious investigator is that
not only do the accounts given by the moderns of each mode of 
existence that she isolates not correspond to their actual 
practice, but that they are very often shocked by the more 
adequate accounts that she comes up with based on her 
investigations. They tend to deny that her accounts are accurate, 
preferring to believe quite naïvely in their own utterly 
unrealistic accounts, and she must exercise much diplomacy to get 
her findings accepted. The pervasiveness of this denegation and 
naïveté are in large part responsible for the difficulty of the 
investigation.
I think this fable of the anthropological investigator is a good 
model of the sort of reading that is appropriate to AN INQUIRY 
INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE. The reader of Latour’s work must live 
with it without giving too much weight to its own self-account, 
and be alert to possible instances of denegation and of naïveté 
(whether authentic or feigned) in the very construction of the 
project within the text. Bernard Stiegler gives us (in “Bernard 
Stiegler's Pharmacy: A Conversation”, Configurations Volume 18, 
Number 3, Fall 2010)  very useful advice in reading Latour’s 
texts:
“Right now I have a stylistic difficulty with Latour. If you will,
for me, Latour -- who I think is a very interesting person -- is 
in a bad relation with philosophy ... he is in a state of 
philosophical denial ... I always have the impression, because of 
this denial, that there is a certain blindness, a certain naïveté 
even, in Latour’s reasoning process, a certain cynicism”.
This gives us a fruitful set of criteria for reading Latour: be on
the lookout for occurrences of philosophical denial, of blindness,
of naïveté, and of cynicism. It is clear that Stiegler thinks that
because of his philosophical denegation Latour is still stuck to 
some extent in naïve empiricism. In effect,Latour’s work embodies 
a double empiricism: an empiricism of networks, that one has just 
to trace and follow, and also one of modes of existence that one 
has to describe and prevent from imposing their felicity 
conditions on another mode.
We can observe the conjoined presence of blindness, naïveté and 
cynicism in the beginning chapters of Latour’s new book: 
1) Blindness: Latour conflates a philosophical definition of the 
Moderns (those who believe in Science’s radical separation from 
Politics and in the dynamic of progress brought about by that 
separation) with an empirical socio-economic defintion (the 
technologically advanced societies of Europe and the United 
States). He passes from one sense to the other without seeming to 
notice, creating a certain degree of vagueness and of conceptual 
confusion in his declarations;
2) Naïveté: Latour’s analyses taken as real-life political 
prescriptions are naïve in that they ignore important socio-
economic realities of class, power, institutions, and cultural .
3) Cynical: Latour is not very reliable in enouncing all the 
stakes of his analyses, and is often pursuing several agendas at 
once. His style is an intervention in a field of forces, allies 
and enemies, not all of which are made explicit, and whose 
characterization often depends more on strategic convenience and 
rhetorical positioning than on straight-talking referential prose.
Does all this invalidate what Latour has to say? Not at all, 
Latour’s “blindness” is counterbalanced by a new insight into 
materiality. Stiegler praises Latour for posing important 
questions and for bringing a concern with “things” into 
philosophy:
“I find that he is extremely intelligent and he often raises 
pertinent questions, but, moreover, he is interested in objects 
and things and this interests me ... I think that the thing, the 
banal “thingness” of the thing, is something extremely important 
that philosophy has a tendency to reject. I therefore regret that 
in Derrida’s work, the critique of logocentrism does not lead in 
the end to a reconsideration of things. Here, Latour is very 
interesting”.
This reaction of Stiegler’s highlights an impression that one may 
have in reading Latour of real novelty embedded in disingenuous 
narration. The avoidance of traditional philosophical jargon is no
doubt a useful heuristic procedure for extracting us from 
sedimented presuppositions. But it has the disadvantage of 
exaggerating the novelty of the analyses and of cloaking important
conceptual affinities and precedents. It cannot be put forward as 
an obligatory methodic principle, but may be of use when 
considered as just one heuristic amongst many. The conclusion for 
reading Latour is that we should both go with the actual network 
of concepts elaborated by Latour and at the same time interpret 
that network in terms of a plurality of perspectives or modes 
insofar as they are pertinent to the matters at hand. Exegesis is 
not straight reading nor free association, but pragmatic 
pertinence.
SITUATING LATOUR’S ENUNCIATIONS: META-LANGUAGE OR NEWSPEAK
Bruno Latour’s book AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE purports to
describe the felicity conditions of a plurality of modes of 
existence and of their corresponding modes of veridiction.  So it 
is reasonable to raise the question of the situation of 
enunciation instituted  in the book, and of the status of Latour’s
own speech acts. In the passage from certainty to trust the 
enunciative modality changes:
“But when one has to appeal to trust, the interlocutory situation 
is entirely different: one has to share the concern for a fragile 
and delicate institution, encumbered with terribly material and 
mundane elements-- oil lobbies, peer evaluation, the constraints 
of model-making, typos in thousand-page-long reports, research 
contracts, computer bugs, and so on” (3).
Latour’s own discourse seems to allude to a possible scientific 
status, by the constant evocation of an “anthropology of the 
Moderns”, yet much of what he says is philosophical in form and 
content, containing idiosyncratic speculation whose evidential 
support is not readily apparent . The lack of clarity over the 
object of the inquiry (the “Moderns” and their “values”) and over 
the potential audience for its results adds to the puzzlement over
the status of his discourse. In the conclusion Latour states:
“Thus while I have spoken all along of an inquiry and even of a 
questionnaire, it is not in the mode of knowledge that I claim to 
be working. The term “inquiry” has to be taken in a plurimodal 
sense whose object is to preserve the diversity of modes. Can we 
call this approach “empirical philosophy”? I am not sure, given 
how indifferent philosophy has become to the tasks of description.
Experimental metaphysics? Cosmopolitics? Comparative anthropology?
Practical ontology? ... To situate this reprise of the rationalist
adventure, but to mark clearly that it will not take place under 
the auspices of Double Click, I have entrusted it to the term 
diplomacy”.
So it is not in the mode of knowledge, yet empirical. In the 
beginning of the book Latour appeals to his status as a 
practitioner of science studies, and we know he has published 
books on a case study of technology and of law. His book on 
religious enunciation REJOICING is not based on a case study but 
on his own (experiential? philosophical?) impressions of what such
utterance is all about. “Plurimodal”, including the mode of 
knowledge but not limited to it, seems an apt description, but so 
does “meta-modal”, if we want to capture the idea that it is not 
political diplomacy that is at play, but ontological diplomacy. 
The scene of this diplomacy is vague too: the investigator must 
show diplomacy with her informers and strive to obtain their 
assent for her redescriptions of their practices and institutions,
diplomacy again in the negotiations between the different modes of
existence, and yet again in the negotiations between the Moderns 
and the “others”.
Despite an effort to locate and free us from category mistakes 
when one mode of existence is confused with or impinges on 
another, Latour himself mixes philosophical considerations and 
empirical claims in a confusing way. The result is a vagueness or 
“muddiness” that complcates his argument and gives an illusion of 
concreteness. There emerges from all this an impression of 
authority, yet the bibliography to support his claims is lacking. 
There is an attempt to exploit the trust the reader may have in 
Latour’s previous work on revisioning of science and have it 
accorded to claims about other domains, institutions, and modes of
existence where no such work is cited. The objections that the 
text envisions come from naive straw men who are trapped in the 
snares of subject-object, the bifurcation nature-society, the 
impossible quest for unmediated certainty, or of double-click 
literalism. There is so much renaming that one has trouble 
formulating objections that have not been rendered impossible by 
the new terminology. An interesting case is the fate of the word 
“transcendence”, which becomes split in two: there is a “bad” 
transcendence and a “good” transcendence, which is defined so as 
to be synonymous with immanence (“immanence, for AIME, is 
synonymous with good transcendence”). This is in line with a 
return to a more consensual (“diplomatic”) posture and an attempt 
to avoid “provocation”, at least at the level of terminology. 
Already Latour had renamed his position from “social 
constructivism” to “constructivism”. Now we have him renouncing 
constructivism in favour of compositionism, and the return of 
values, institutions, and even (“good”) transcendence. There are 
no boundaries between domains, but one may not mix different modes
of existence, under penalty of “category mistake”. Yet one may 
ask: are all such crossings sterile errors? If this ontology is 
diachronic, with modes of existence evolving, mutating, coming 
into being and disappearing, can such crossings sometimes be 
productive? The terminology of category mistakes, though necessary
for eliminating “bad” mixtures, may eliminate too much (what about
the possibility of “good” mixtures and tend towards stasis. Once 
we have our map of values and modes that characterise us are we 
just going to agree to be different from our others, or are we 
going to swap and mix with them? It is strange to police the 
proliferation of hybrids at the object level with the stern 
warnings against categorial confusion at the meta-level.
On the question of “Values”, I think that Latour effectuates an 
illegitimate transition at the beginning of the book from 
experience to value in his presentation of his project.  Then he 
gives the value thus located a new content (“new account”). So the
defence of the values of the moderns is a strange tension of 
conservative and revisionary moves.
Latour’s “felicity conditions” are to be distinguished from the 
values he posits, being rather the criteria determining that some 
value has been respected or attained, or not. Reducing science to 
the value of “objectivity” as Latour does in the introduction, or 
religion to conversion, is a dubious move.The idea that each mode 
of existence embodies a “value” that can be isolated out is a 
rhetorical reduction.  It is rhetorical because it consists in 
persuasively re-defining the experience underlying a mode of 
existence while giving the appearance of simply re-stating that 
experience; it is a reduction in that something of the complexity 
of that experience is lost. Wanting us to give up the “belief in 
beliefs” in favour of a belief in values seems little gain, but 
tends towards denying any cognitive dimension to values. There is 
also the inter-textual aspect. Latour relies heavily on a fuzzy 
set of allusions to previous French philosophers. In particular 
much of his pluralism has a Deleuzian ring, just as his 
declaration of the end of the modernist master narrative of 
Emancipation is a Lyotardian concept. In Deleuze’s terms value is 
always a term for the conformist codification of practices and of 
modes of existence, and it is rather singular evaluations that 
allow us to construct our modes of existence without succombing to
transcendence in the sense of a higher objective court of appeal. 
Latour seems to be trying to revamp the terminology to produce 
more conservative conclusions than such thinkers worked towards; 
There is a whole strand of re-defining the terms of his 
predecessors rather than confronting them that goes in the same 
direction; His re-defining of “deconstruction” into purely 
negative critical thought is an important example. His wiping out 
of two generations of predecessors is of a piece with his 
considering only straw man objectors. Noone wants to be a dualist 
still believing in subect-object or the bifurcation of Nature and 
Society, noone wants to believe in the unmediated access to the 
real or in the uniitary autonomous subject. But the victory over 
(i.e. the deconstruction of) these concepts in favour of (it was 
not just negative) multiplicities of heterogeneous elements 
arranged in immanent networks – this was not Latour’s contribution
but that of his immediate predecessors. So I think that looking 
very warily at a seemingly innocent word such as “value” is 
important to understand Latour’s project in a wider intellectual 
context than that which he himself indicates explicitly. An 
unreliable narrator of the necessity of trust is not to be taken 
at face value.
THE DEMOCRACY OF TRUST AND THE VALUE OF “PROT-”
At the beginning of AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE Bruno 
Latour recounts an anecdote to illustrate the new situation we 
find ourselves in today, at the end of the “modernist 
parenthesis”:
“They’re sitting around a table, some fifteen French 
industrialists responsible for sustainable development in various 
companies, facing a professor of climatology, a researcher from 
the Collège de France. It’s the fall of 2010; a battle is raging 
about whether the current climate disturbances are of human origin
or not. One of the industrialists asks the professor a question I 
find a little cavalier: “But why should we believe you, any more 
than the others?” I’m astonished. Why does he put them on the same
footing, as if it were a simple difference of opinion between this
climate specialist and those who are called climate skeptics...?”
Latour wonders if the scientist will respond with a summary of the
indisputable data leading to certain knowledge, but the response 
is a summary of “the large number of researchers involved in 
climate analysis, the complex system for verifying data, the 
articles and reports, the principle of peer evaluation, the vast 
network of weather stations, floating weather buoys, satellites, 
and computers that ensure the flow of information... the pitfalls 
of the models that are needed to correct the data as well as the 
series of doubts that have had to be addressed on each of these 
points”.
No appeal to indubitable data or to certain knowledge, but to 
trust in the institution of science: “He sees no higher court of 
appeals”.
Latour recounts being shocked by the sceptical question of the 
industrialist, surprised at the lack of appeal to the certainty of
expert knowledge, and favorably impressed by the scientist’s 
account of the research process and by his recourse to trust in 
the institution. He sees a shift in philosophy of science, in 
epistemology, in ontology, in this appeal to trust instead of to 
certainty and to the institution instead of to unmediated access. 
There is some complacence here as Latour finds that scientists 
have shifted from their Cartesian dogmatism and certainty to a 
Jamesian (and by implication Latourian) pragmatism. By implication
it is really Latour who won the “Science Wars”.
Yet Latour does not really explain why this change in behaviour 
has taken place. “The modernist parenthesis is at an end” is a 
rather vague explanatory hypothesis, itself in need of 
explanation. One problem is that the notion of modernism is 
defined in a variety of ways, such that its extension is quite 
vague. One definition of the moderns is: those for whom others 
have beliefs whereas they have knowledge. On this definition the 
modernist parenthesis goes back to Plato, or even to Moses. More 
often it is limited to Europe ASR (After the Scientific 
Revolution).
Latour’s explanation for the change in metaphysics that 
characterises the change of epoch is the gravity of the ecological
crises that beset us. The value of Certainty leads to 
inflexibility, whereas the times require flexibility and fluidity 
under the value of Trust. But this notion of the epoch is 
ambiguous between an internal and an external version. Have the 
scientists themselves due to new research findings discovered that
they must abandon their dogmatic rigidity and authoritarian 
tendencies? Or has the rise of a less credulous and less 
deferential attitude in all domains led scientists to revise their
epistemology and their rhetorical strategies?
In the anecdote recounted by Latour we have a scientist being 
subjected to a cavalier question by an industrialist who has 
chosen to relay, according to Latour, the sort of objections that 
the climate sceptics use. The scientist replies philosophically, 
but why? One industrialist is easily snobbed and dismissed (unless
he represents Big Money needed by the scientists or his 
colleagues). But many objections made in all sorts of venues from 
the TV to the classroom, from philosophical journals to SF novels 
may have played their part in tempering the expert’s attitude. 
This is the development of what Steve Fuller calls “protscience“, 
the urge towards a democratisation of science impelled by a sort 
of protestant revolution conducted by the users of science. This 
movement has had negative effects, such as making room for the 
naive or cynical climate sceptics and for the intelligent 
designers. But it has also had the positive effect of demanding 
more concrete explanations, of the type the climate expert gives 
in the anecdote, than just the assertion “Science says it is so”.
What I am arguing is that where Latour sees the sign of a new 
epoch in the scientist’s response, we can also see its sign in the
industrialist’s question. No contradiction with Latour’s project, 
but a slight shift of emphasis. We may follow the lead provided 
Steve Fuller, who describes the rise of an attitude that is 
sceptical of the certainty of science without falling into the 
opposition between trust and denialism. This is what he calls 
protscience, and he hypothesises that it may be responsible for 
the contemporary passage from the appeal to the absolute authority
of the expert to the call for reasoned and provisional trust in 
the scientific community. Perhaps he should integrate into each 
mode its own “PROT-”, so that we would have not just protscience 
but also protlaw, protanalysis, proteconomy and even protreligion 
(gnostics, hermeticists, alchemists included). Protanalysis is 
covered already by the integration of Tobie Nathan's 
ethnopsychiatry. Protreligion would lead to combining MET and REL 
as submodes under a more embracing supermode, that one could call 
IND (or process of individuation).
LATOUR AND BADIOU
The parallel between Latour’s and Badiou’s ontologies is important
to keep in mind as I think that it fruitfully illuminates both 
projects. One of the tasks with reading Latour is to re-establish 
a philosophical context without dragging his work back into a set 
of presuppositions that he is trying to escape. An examination of 
Latour’s conceptual debts to post-structuralist thinkers 
demonstrates that Latour’s book is both more speculative and less 
empirical than advertised, but the comparison with Badiou shows 
that there is a fundamental difference in their approaches. Badiou
is still doing a priori philosophy and has shown himself incapable
of expanding the number of truth procedures that he posits (for 
example, to include religion), while there is no real reason 
inside his system not to envisage other such procedures. We can 
conclude that Latour’s way of taking up the notions of ontology 
and of truth, and of pluralising them in terms of an open list of 
modes of veridiction and of existence, is empirical in spirit. 
Further, Latour’s system proposes much more of a diachronic 
ontology (Latour’s “being-as-other”, including both alterity and 
alteration) from the very beginning, whereas Badiou’s ontology is 
synchronic at the level of Being, with a diachronic supplement in 
the notion of the event.
Contrary to Badiou, Latour does not reactivate a foundational 
style, rather he does everything to avoid such a thing.Badiou’s 
philosophy is foundational in a very classical sense, and I think 
his idea that “mathematics is ontology” is a regressive move. 
Despite his explicit claims, Badiou’s difference with the later 
Wittgenstein is not so much that of his rejection of the 
“linguistic turn” as that of his failure to effectuate the 
diachronic turn or the abandon of the idea of foundations. For 
Wittgenstein mathematics is a constantly evolving patchwork, and 
set theory is not at all the foundational instance that it is for 
Badiou. Wittgenstein was also quite intent on separating religious
experience from the type of existence investigated by the 
sciences, and on separating psychological experience from 
psychoanalysis, which he regarded as an invasive mythology. So 
Latour is far closer to Wittgenstein than he is to Badiou.
For Badiou mathematics is ontology, and there is no other: there 
is only one mode of existence. His is a pluralism of content, 
everything is multiplicity of multiplicities. Latour proposes a 
pluralism of modes of existence and not just of content, and so 
for him ontology is itself multiple. The modes are a little like 
regional ontologies, only they do not exist as regions inside some
totalising space, but are qualitatively incommensurable. In that 
respect he is closer to Wittgenstein than to Badiou.
LATOUR AND STIEGLER: Ideology and Modes of Existence
Reading Bruno Latour and Geof Bowker’s discussion of the different
approaches to science in France and in the English-speaking world,
one can begin to situate the contribution of Latour’s new book to 
discussions that are traversed by the Anglophone/Continental 
divide. Each side sees the other as ignoring crucial problems, so 
rather than choose sides Bowker and Latour attempt a symmetric 
account of the difference. Their observations correspond to my own
experience of the differences of approach, which sometimes has 
produced difficulties of communication with French philosophers 
over the 30 years I have been living here in France, and also some
frustration at the differing but equally limiting presuppostions 
on both sides.
This set of differences is something I noticed from the beginning 
when I arrived in France in 1980. One element is that the notions 
of theory-ladenness and incommensurability, which had led to 
intense discussions in Anglophone philosophy of science in the 60s
and 70s, had been accepted as evident since the beginning of the 
20th Century. However, this strong anti-empricist orientation did 
not lead to any questioning of the epistemological status of 
science, nor to its relativisation in terms of outside, 
psychological and social, influences. This also explains why 
Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend are typically treated as more or less
the same, separated only by minor theoretical nuances. For the 
French epistemologists, science is essentially a theoretical 
rather than empirical enterprise. However, this does not 
relativise science, which is simply posited as rational par 
excellence.
This rejoins my own observation that French philosophical 
formulations often sound radical when read in an Anglophone 
context, but have their scope limited in France by shared implicit
presuppositions. Similarly, many radical Anglophone pronouncements
seem obvious to the French, as they subtract out any deep 
questioning of scientific rationality.
Bernard Stiegler, who is not cited in Latour and Bowker’s text, 
falls into the asymmetry imposed by this dichotomy. He does not 
tackle critically the notion of science, yet his restoration of 
the centrality of the concept of ideology in his recent book 
PHARMACOLOGIE DU FRONT NATIONAL leaves him in an ambiguous 
situation with respect to science. Sometimes Stiegler praises 
science for its critical rationality, for its ability to question 
and revise even its most basic assumptions and most entrenched 
interpretations. Sometimes he finds ideological assumptions 
embedded in proposed scientific paradigms e.g. neo-liberal 
economics (but never in the hard sciences), embodying a dogmatic 
process of rationalisation. His recent references to a “Darwinian”
notion of controversy (where rival interpretations compete until 
the best interpretation survives) tend towards enshrining a monist
principle where the plurality of interpretations in a domain are 
provisionally entertained in view of ultimate convergence on a 
single winner.
Bruno Latour does not make use of the notion of “ideology” in his 
theoretical meta-language, no doublt considering it to be too 
molar or macro-conceptual, covering too many different sorts of 
cases to be a useful theoretical term. Latour uses instead the 
notion of illegitimate crossings between different forms of 
enunciation/modes of existence. These are closely equivalent to 
the long chains of transindividuation that Bernard Stiegler 
evokes. One could transform Stiegler’s theoretical vocabulary 
slightly and talk in terms of modes of transindividuation. This 
would have the advantage of emphasising that the modes of 
existence are not synchronic universals, but contingent, 
diachronic contingent formations. This diachronicity is allowed 
for but is not very well articulated in Latour’s system.
When one mode of existence imposes its own felicity conditions on 
another, the resulting category mistake produces illegitimate 
translations that travesty the meaning of the utterances, and give
an inadequate account of the existence corresponding entities. So 
the past and present of a mode is deformed, and its capacity for 
fruitful innovation is wiped out. In Oldspeak we could say that 
this imposition or infringement produces “ideological” 
deformations of the different modes of existence, where the 
difference between the experience of a mode on the one hand and 
the accounts given by its practitioners and adherents. Such 
monological translation creates problems and at the same time 
removes any possibility of resolving them.
In each case of “crossing” or of encounter between different 
modes, one has to discern the different modes present in the 
situation and analyse their functioning. It is important to see if
there are hegemonic crossings, where one mode imposes its 
conditions on the others, or rather compositional crossings, where
each mode functions according to its own conditions in a 
diplomatically satisfying common assemblage. Yet even Latour does 
not allow for the possibility of heuristically positive 
interferences between modes e.g. the role of Newton’s religious 
beliefs in his scientific constructions. Stiegler in his recent 
seminars emphasises the need for “transgression”, and so the 
question becomes are all transgressive crossings necessarily 
sterie?
EMPIRICISM VS HERMENEUTICS (1): READING LATOUR RELIGIOUSLY
Does Bruno Latour have two philosophies, as he claims recently, or
just one? Is this a empirical or “double-click” question? Or is it
a hermeneutical question? does it depend on our interpretation, 
which may be different than the one Latour gives of his own work? 
Perhaps it is even religious? Latour himself declares
“Groping, contradictory exegesis: this is religion itself. 
Etymology attests to this: religion is the relationship among or, 
better still, the relativism of interpretations; the certainty 
that one obtains truth only through a new path of alterations, 
inventions, deviations that make it possible to obtain, or not, 
against rote reiteration and wear and tear, the faithful renewal 
of what has been said” (AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE, 313).
This is good advice on how to read his book: avoid the weak 
reproductive reading of “rote reiteration”, and read critically 
and creatively to engage in the “faithful renewal” of what Latour 
has written. Reading is interpretation and not repetition, and 
such interpretation is necessarily plurimodal.  Hermeneutics is 
thus essential to Latour’s thought, and to reading his books. In 
the list of authors that constitute his hermeneutic horizon, I 
would not include in pride of place such official hermeneutic 
authors as Dilthey, Gadamer, and Ricoeur. Rather precedence should
be given to Spinoza, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Deleuze.
Bad advice would begin by telling people not to read in terms of 
their preferred modes of existence, but rather according to one’s 
own favoured mode. This is the monist or monotheist mode of 
reading that judges everything in terms of its one supreme value. 
Reading, I have argued, is interpretation, it cannot be contained 
within the borders of one domain. Reading is tied to pluralism and
intensity, it “takes into account the fact that a border indicates
less a dividing line between two homogeneous sets than an 
intensification of crossborder traffic between foreign elements” 
(AIME, 30).
Some good work of exegesis has been done on Latour’s work in view 
of the intensification of our reading experience. I do not see 
critical discussion as condemned to remain at the level of mere 
generalities, expressing emotional reactions of rejection or 
appropriation. A good hermeneutic reading certainly involves not 
just linear rote summary but global framing, wandering 
trajectories, and plurimodal intensities, including critical 
intensity (something that Latour is full of, despite his 
inveighing against “critique”).
One possible conclusion that one could draw from the book is that 
of the need for “religious studies”, on the model of science 
studies, to complete or transform the perspectives of this 
preliminary report. Unfortunately, there is nothing in AN INQUIRY 
INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE, or any other of Latour’s texts, to show 
that he has done any field work on the subject of religion, of 
anything approaching the tenor and rigour of the work he has done 
for Science and Law and Technology. That is a very serious 
shortcoming of AIME. Doing religious studies is not the same thing
as speaking religiously, nor is speaking religiously necessarily 
speaking about God. The “religious” is a mode of veridiction, not 
a special content or an obligatory name. It directs our attention 
(to the nearest and the neighbour). If I read Latour’s book with 
attention, as neighbour, with all I’ve got, then I am reading it 
religiously whether I speak of God or not.
This raises the question of the cognitive dimension of religion as
Latour’s professed view seems to favour a form of reductionist 
demarcationism which is in contradiction with the pluralism he 
espouses. There are serious problems with Latour’s use of the 
information/transformation dichotomy, his demarcation of science 
from religion, and the resulting referential neutralisation of 
religion. His views on religion are worrisome because they are 
utterly unempirical, ie they are not based on any concrete 
research with the diverse populations of believers, but on his own
experiences, readings, and reflexions. Yet in REJOICING, and even 
more so in AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE he relies on the 
authority given him by his studies on science, technology and law 
to insinuate that his views on religion are part of an empirical 
“anthropological” investigation.
A comparison with the ideas of Paul Feyerabend is illuminating. 
Feyerabend recognises an apparent qualitative difference between 
religious traditions and straight referential traditions such as 
science, in that religion explicitly includes a performative (or 
transformative) aspect, but not in such a way as to replace or 
exclude the referential cognitive aspect. So the difference in 
kind is that religious traditions are more complete than (most) 
secular traditions, in that they include both a performative and a
cognitive dimension. A second difference is that in fact, but 
unbeknownst to them and so only in repressed and truncated form, 
secular traditions have this performative aspect too. 
Latour’s account of religion seems open to the the accusation of 
formalism, of establishing a preserve for a merely “generic” 
religion with no creedal content. It is also protectionist, where 
Feyerabend’s views are transversalist and non-demarcationist, 
favorising a symmetrical account arguing that both religion and 
science have a cognitive dimension, and that both of them are 
performative, i.e. that the cognitive/performative distinction is 
not pertinent for demarcating science and religion. Not only is 
there no absolute conceptual distinction, there is also 
historically a constant practice of interference and of heuristic 
interaction. Religion has “interfered” positively with science 
throughout its history, and not just negatively as a popular 
positivist myth would have us believe.
The distinction in terms of different “felicity conditions” is not
at all new, and was advanced by post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of
religion over 40 years ago. It is a protectionist, 
territorialising, conservative move, unworthy of the rest of 
Latour’s pluralist ontology. It is too sharp a distinction, and 
its normative force has a potentially negative effect on the 
conduct of science. Such a demarcationist approach is 
methodologically illegitimate (it is normative and not “agnostic”,
as Latour’s method requires). It is also both purificatory (an 
approach that Latour condemns in his critique of modernity) and 
unrealistic, and so would have had disastrous consequences for 
scientific progress if it had been applied by the actors whose 
intuitions and comportment are supposed to be described in 
Latour’s account.
The most that Latour can do is to create a protected reserve with 
its own felicity conditions for some sort of “generic” religion. 
There is something very diluted about a shared régime of 
religiosity that does not foreground the actual beliefs and 
objections, the creeds and the controversies that matter to actual
religious observance, which are not mere differences of opinion 
but incommensurable rifts within the religious “truth régime”. 
Either the particular identity of his religious obedience is 
dissolved, or Latour is committing the fallacy of homogeneity by 
his generic partitioning of the truth régimes. He is thus 
condemned by his non-cognitivist approach to religion both to 
embrace the empirical transversality and diversity of religious 
experience(pluralism) and to turn it against the established 
creedal boundaries, and so to invalidate actual religious 
affiliation and institutional identity by voiding them of all 
cognitive content (formalism). 
EMPIRICISM vs HERMENEUTICS (2): Latour's “two philosophies”
AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE purports to be the sequel to WE
HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN, published 20 years earlier. Where that 
book’s emphasis was mainly negative, as the title shows, 
deconstructing the false identity that was mistakenly supposed to 
characterise us, this new book is positive in its aim to present 
what we have been and still are. In the last post we saw that the 
book is a hermeneutic treatise, both exemplifying a 
reinterpretation of the Moderns, purporting to replace the 
erroneous interpretation that has been coextensive with the modern
epoch, and calling for interpretation in its turn. This 
hermeneutic dimension  is confirmed by the “origin story” that 
Latour recounts about the beginnings of his project in his Roman 
Catholic youth and in his apprenticeship in Biblical exegesis:
“the systematic destruction by exegesis of all dogmatic 
certitudes, far from weakening the truth value that the successive
glosses played out over and over, made it possible at last to 
raise the question of religious truth. But only on condition of 
acknowledging that there was an itinerary of veridiction with its 
own felicity conditions” (BIOGRAPHY OF AN INVESTIGATION, 3).
So in Latour’s intellectual biography religion and hermeneutics 
come first, and the study of science comes later to confirm this 
idea of a non-empirical itinerary of veridiction, incommensurable 
with the ideal of pure unmediated contact with the real:
“Imagine my amazement when I discovered, in Guillemin’s laboratory
in 1975, located in a splendid Louis Kahn building overlooking the
Pacific Ocean, that scientific work bore a strange resemblance to 
the exegesis I had left behind in Burgundy” (BIOGRAPHY OF AN 
INVESTIGATION, 5).
Yet the book whose genesis is thus related proceeds in a different
order, no longer biographical but pedagogical. Strangely it 
foregrounds a claim to be a treatise of “empirical philosophy”, 
purporting to give a more adequate account of our experience:
“Only experience will tell us whether this hybrid apparatus using 
new techniques of reading, writing, and collective inquiry 
facilitates or complicates the work of empirical
philosophy that it seeks to launch” (AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF 
EXISTENCE, xx-xxi).
In the first two chapters Latour begins with science and the 
discovery of its dependance on equipment and networks, proceeds to
Law as an example of another type of veridiction and then 
introduces religion as a confirming instance, comporting yet 
another itinerary of veridiction. This sequence of science-law-
religion occurs twice, first in Chapter One and then again in 
Chapter Two. Far from being a simple empirical account of Latour’s
intellectual evolution, it is a rational reconstruction designed 
to establish the idea that Latour’s work has passed from one 
philosophy (actor-network theory) to another (modes of existence 
project), and that the reasons for the passage are empirical.
The book itself abounds in “empirical” vocabulary, distinguishing 
the experience and values of the Moderns from the accounts given 
of their experience. Latour proposes to remain “faithful” to the 
experience but to give more adequate accounts. He enshrines this 
empirical commitment as a methodological principle giving rise to 
a set of “specific tests” of the adequacy of his account: “The 
first is factual and empirical: have we been faithful to the
field by supplying proofs of our claims?” (65). The passage from 
Chapter One with its networks to Chapter Two with its prepositions
corresponding to different modes seems to correspond to this 
passage from one philosophy to another.
This discrepancy between biography and rational reconstruction is 
reinforced if we take into account the Deleuzian background and 
resonances of Latour’s vocabulary. In his analyses of Spinoza and 
the construction of a plane of immanence Deleuze associates 
inextricably a quantitative pluralism of heterogeneous elements 
with a qualitative pluralism of their composition in modes of 
existence. For example here in a seminar from December 9th 1980: 
“Les deux critères de l’éthique, en d’autres termes, la 
distinction quantitative des existants, et l’opposition 
qualitative des modes d’existence, la polarisation qualitative des
modes d’existence, vont être les deux manières dont les existants 
sont dans l’être. Ca va être les liens de l’Éthique avec 
l’Ontologie”. (“The two criteria of ethics, in other words, the 
quantitative distinction of existents, and the qualitative 
opposition of modes of existence, the qualitative polarisation of 
modes of existence, are going to be the two manners in which 
existents are in being. That will be the relation between the 
Ethics and Ontology”, my translation).
So from the point of view of the philosophical background to 
Latour’s thought there seems to be no reason to conceive of his 
evolution as containing two distinct philosophies. The 
heterogeneous networks and the differing modes of existence are 
inseparable for Deleuze, and Latour traces his involvement with 
Deleuze’s thought back to his doctoral thesis:
“In a thesis defended in 1985 ... I had developed that argument in
an analysis of
Mark’s gospel and of “Saint” Péguy.... A bit of Derrida and Lévi-
Strauss plus a large dose of Deleuze helped give the argument the 
contemporary sheen that neither Péguy nor Bultmann, of course, 
could have provided” (BIOGRAPHY, 3).
LATOUR, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PRIMACY OF THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT
Bruno Latour’s religious outlook is central to AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODES OF EXISTENCE, and his discovery of different modes of 
enunciation (and thus of existence) goes back to his 
apprenticeship in Biblical exegesis. Indeed religious enunciation 
appears as a model for the rest: “there are few institutions more 
obsessed with the distinction between truth and falsity than the 
religious institution. And yet we also understand that it would be
erroneous to claim to judge religious veridiction according to the
entirely distinct modes of law or science” (45). Religion needs to
be judged by its own specific interpretative key.
In religion we see most clearly and most intensely the concern 
with being “faithful” to  a message that requires constant 
“innovation” in order to be preserved and transmitted anew:
“It is entirely possible, our anthropologist tells herself, that 
the relation found here between value and institution is a unique 
case. Only in the religious domain--and perhaps only in the 
history of the Christian churches--would we find such a series of 
betrayals, inventions, reforms, new starts, elaborations, all 
concentrated and judged on the basis of the principal question of 
whether one is remaining faithful or not to the initial message. 
But her own idea (the origin of her eureka moment) is that the 
situation is perhaps the same for all the Moderns’ institutions” 
(55).
There is a substantial overlap here with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
views on different “forms of life” in relation to the question of 
the status of the religious as mode of enunciation and of 
existence. Wittgenstein began his PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS with an 
appeal to the “spirit” in which he wished it to be read: “This 
book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. 
This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast 
stream of European and American civilization in which all of us 
stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in 
building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in
striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what 
structure” (Foreword, 1930). This spirit is not at all “Modern”, 
in that it is not exclusively devoted to following the “onwards 
movement” of modernization, yet it is not against that movement 
either: it is not anti-modern, but rather what Bruno Latour calls 
“amodern”:
“How will we call this retrospective discovery that we have never 
been modern? Post-modern? No since this would imply a belief that 
we have been what we have never been. I propose to call it 
amodern” (Postmodern? No Simply Amodern. Steps Towards an 
Anthropology of Science. An essay Review).
Wittgenstein then proceeds to an invocation of God (“I would like 
to say ‘This book is written to the glory of God’, but nowadays 
that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly 
understood. It means the book is written in good will, and in so 
far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author 
would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it of these 
impurities further than he himself is free of them”). 
Wittgenstein’s views on religion are complex, but he did not see 
religion as a matter of fact, or a question of belief. He saw it 
as dealing with matters of concern, a deepened attitude to life 
involving the whole person, embodying the conversion from the bad 
will of vanity or egoism to the good will of “doing the will of 
God”.
Bruno Latour begins his book AN ENQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE 
with an epigraph: “Si scires donum dei” (“If thou didst know the 
gift of God”). This is from The Gospel according to John, Chapter 
4, verse 10, where Jesus asks for water from a Samaritan woman and
promises the water of everlasting life. The whole incident is 
relevant to Latour’s system of modes existence. Jesus asks for 
literal water (mode of existence DC, double click) and declares 
that he can give “living water” (mode of existence REL, 
religious). He convinces her he is a prophet by showing that he 
knows intimate details of her life (DC), but he proposes a 
different sort of knowledge, adoration of the Father “in spirit 
and in truth”. In Latourian terms Jesus’s words must be understood
in a different “interpretative key”, what Wittgenstein calls a 
different “spirit”, than the dead letter of double-click’s mode of
veridiction.
Indeed, Latour does not hesitate to conceive his whole ontological
project, his pluralism of modes of existence, in religious terms, 
as a Pentecostal pluralism, a form of speaking in tongues. His 
conceptual persona, an anthropological investigatress studying the
modes of existence of the Moderns
“purports to be speaking while obeying all the felicity conditions
of each mode, while expressing herself in as many languages as 
there are modes. In other words, she is hoping for another 
Pentecost miracle: everyone would understand in his or her own 
tongue and would judge truth and falsity according to his or her 
own felicity conditions. Fidelity to the field comes at this 
price” (58).
The repeated references to the idea of an “empirical philosophy” 
must themselves be understood in the right interpretative key. 
Latour seems to be appealing to the same sort of authority as that
of the empirical sciences, but this is just a convenient 
rhetorical mask. He defines such reference to uninterpreted facts 
as “first wave empiricism” and makes clear that such a philosophy 
is not even adequate to the sciences that it takes as the model to
impose on all enunciation. In the expression “empirical 
philosophy” he can only mean “second wave empiricism” keyed to the
plurality of modes of existence and respectful of  the multiple 
interpretative keys. There is something strangely circular about 
this idea of “fidelity to the field”, and so it is not surprising 
that Latour makes no real discoveries of unsuspected régimes of 
enunciation, but lifts each readily recognizable domain to the 
régime of enunciation that characterises it most essentially. The 
procedure amounts to a form of  what Willard Van Orman Quine 
called “semantic ascent”, and the régimes of enunciation thus 
“found” (and their corresponding modes of existence) are the 
empirical correlates of a prior hermeneutic decision.
RYLE AND LATOUR: ON CATEGORY MISTAKES
At the beginning of Chapter Two of AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF 
EXISTENCE Bruno Latour recounts an anecdote based on Gilbert 
Ryle’s introduction of the notion of category mistake in THE 
CONCEPT OF MIND (1949): “The canonical example involves a foreign 
visitor going through the buildings of the Sorbonne, one after 
another; at the end of the day, he complains that he “hasn’t seen 
the University of the Sorbonne.” His request had been 
misunderstood: he wanted to see an institution, but he had been 
shown buildings . . . For he had sought in one entity an entirely 
different entity from what the first could show him” (AN INQUIRY 
INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE, 48-49).
Latour’s initial comment on this story is a little surprising, as 
he supposes that the visitor’s request would have been satisfied 
if he had been introduced to the rector, to the faculty assembly, 
or to the university’s attorney, but this supposition is itself 
based on a category mistake, since Latour is here confusing the 
University as an institution with particular members or 
representatives of that institution. Latour then proceeds to 
explain: “His interlocutors had misheard the key in which what he 
was requesting could be judged true or false, satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory” (49). Ryle’s name is not cited, but this remark is
faithful to Ryle’s analysis of category mistakes as based on a 
misapplication of concepts consisting in allocating them to the 
wrong logical type.
Latour’s explanation follows from the introduction, in Chapter 
One, of his thesis concerning “the pluralism of modes and thus the
plurality of keys by means of which their truth or falsity is 
judged” (18). The context he gives is that of Austin’s theory of 
speech acts:
“But the difficulty is not so great, after all, if we turn to the 
work done by J. L. Austin and his successors on “speech acts.” The
notions of felicity and infelicity conditions, now solidly 
established in our intellectual traditions, make it possible to 
contrast very different types of veridiction without reducing them
to a single model” (18).
If we look up the expression”category mistake” on the site 
associated with the book, we find this entry:
“The expression is valuable in beginning to separate the different
modes: it supposes that we question a situation in a key which we 
soon realize is not the right one and in which it will be 
pointless to persist. Better simply to change key. The phrase is 
attributed to (Ryle, 1949 [200]), who wanted to counter the 
Bifurcation of soul and body; his example is of a visitor wishing 
to visit the University of Oxford, who complains after seeing a 
large number of buildings that he has still not seen the 
University”.
It is interesting to compare Latour’s account with the original 
version, which is a little clearer:
“A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is 
shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, 
scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks 
‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the
Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists 
experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in
which reside and work the members of your University.’
It has then to be explained to him that the University is not 
another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the 
colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The 
University is just the way in which all that he has already seen 
is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination is 
understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his 
innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church,
the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to 
speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member 
of the class of which these other units are members. He was 
mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that 
to which the other institutions belong” (THE CONCEPT OF MIND, 6).
This mistake of allocating a term to the wrong category is an 
error in logical grammar. Latour seems to want to echo this 
analysis when he chooses the term “preposition” to designate the 
interpretive key necessary to situate a set of utterances in their
appropriate category, to understand them according to the correct 
régime of enunciation, and to follow their particular trajectory 
of veridiction:
“To designate these different trajectories, I have chosen the term
preposition, using it in
its most literal, grammatical sense, to mark a position-taking 
that comes before a proposition is stated, determining how the 
proposition is to be grasped and thus constituting its 
interpretive key”.
This use of “preposition” is in fact metaphorical, and not at all 
“literal” (word added by the translator) nor “grammatical” (the 
grammatical category of preposition is not at all engaged), but 
etymological and morphological: “preposition” is analysed into 
pre-position. Here again Latour is guilty of a category mistake. A
further example of this non-literal use of  the term “preposition”
comes in Chapter Six when Latour discusses the difference between 
his project and critical thought as exemplified in Derrida’s 
deconstruction: “And it is finally Derrida, the Zeno of 
“differance,” who was right always to preface the notion of 
construction with the preposition “de”: constructivism is always 
in fact de-construction” (156). This is a grammatical error, we 
are not properly talking about a preposition but about the prefix 
“de-”. Thus the author finds himself once more enmeshed in the 
very error that his manual is warning against.
LATOUR’S PLURALISM 2.O: CAN WE PLURALISE THE PLURALISTS?
Pluralism becomes interesting when it is not just an 
acknowledgement of a plurality of closed and finished totalities 
but when it sees each totality as open and porous, whose 
unification is an ongoing process, and constituted as well of open
and porous subpluralities. One of the consequences of this way of 
thinking is that totalities are not consituted by one sole 
synthesis, but by several different and conflicting operations of 
synthesis that may draw the boundaries in different ways. Another 
is that the subpluralities are in interaction inside a totality 
and between totalities. So I would distinguish a “structuralist” 
pluralism emphasising macroscopic wholes and closure, and a 
“poststructuralist” pluralism that completes this picture with a 
swarm of underlying interferences and interactions and 
hybridisations.
This means that pluralists in this sense are ready to analyse 
innovations in terms of transformation, transfer, translation, 
transport, transversality, etc and to break down all identities 
into multiplicitous components. The problem is that they only 
rarely incorporate these insights into their style of work. 
Deleuze and Guattari, with their idea of the rhizome and with 
their slogan “pluralism is not just something you talk about it’s 
something you do” (my words), made important gestures in this 
direction. But more can and should be done.
When these pluralists explain that closed totalities are 
hallucinatory or fantasmatic pseudo-entities (ie the opposite of 
Luhmann’s notion of “operational closure”, which characterises 
what I am calling structuralist pluralism)) with quantum tunnels 
and relativistic wormholes underlying and undermining their macro-
structure, then they should not act like they were the only 
pluralists in the world. No, Latour’s system is not born from some
philosophical tabula rasa and he is wrong not to engage with past 
and present pluralists, and when he talks about Souriau and modes 
of existence he is doing misdirection in my eyes. He is wrong to 
talk about pluralism without discussing people like Laruelle and 
Stiegler and Deleuze and Feyerabend and Badiou, who sometimes 
confirm sometimes contradict his analyses, and sometimes just 
plain go further along that path than he does. etc etc.
Latour wishes to avoid “fundamentalism” in questions of religion 
and also of science and politics. He defines this fundamentalism 
as “the refusal of controversies” (i.e.the refusal of discussions 
where there is no pre-given arbiter) and “the attempted exercise 
of hegemony of one mode of existence over the others” (interview 
“L’universel, il faut le faire” in CRITIQUE, Nov. 2012, p 953). 
This dogmatic domination is what many pluralists have fought under
the name of reductionism. Reduction lies in treating religion as a
matter of belief, and as submitted to the same truth-régime as 
referential domains like science. Latour is quite explicit that 
for him, and I think for many other religious people, religion is 
not a question of belief at all, not a question of reference to 
the physical world, but one of performative invocation and 
transformative message. One can find examples of this non-
cognitivist approach to religion in the movement of 
demythologisation, but also in Dreyfus and Kelly’s ALL THINGS 
SHINING, and in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. 
Slavoj Zizek propounds this sort of approach as the premise of a 
possible emancipatory use of religion. It may be a minority 
position compared to the number of fundamentalists, but it is not 
negligeable, and Latour is not a lone voice crying in the 
wilderness.
From this point of view fundamentalism as the insistence on 
defining religion as a matter of belief in factual propositions 
about the world is a deformation of religion. This 
“transformative” or “performative” understanding of religion has 
something good and something bad to it. The bad part is that it 
looks suspiciously like trying to have your cake and eat it too, 
making seeming claims about the world and then dancing back and 
saying that you are in fact doing something else entirely, making 
your propositions immune to criticism. But the good part is that 
it preserves an important use for religious language, defending it
against its positivistic elimination as mere superstition. I must 
admit that I am not indifferent to this language if it is used 
“poetically”, that is to say to express deep or transformative 
experiences. But I would argue here that the religious person 
would have to accept that this poetic and transformative language 
is becoming in itself more pluralist. The brute fact of finding 
that one is moved by certain words and images and rituals that are
closely tied to profound experiences and insights becomes a little
suspicious when it conveniently conforms to a pre-constituted 
faith, let us say Catholicism in Latour’s case. Given the 
empirical diversity of the “varieties of religious experience”, to
use William James’ expression, this is too convenient by far!
Many people make use of “religious” language, widely interpreted, 
outside all instituted religious denominations. Such language 
occurs in the context of the practice of yoga or meditation, of 
analysis or of the martial arts, in songs and films and comic 
books. It is employed even by those who consider themselves to be 
total atheists. This is why one can consider that there is more to
religion than the making of referential claims about the physical 
universe, and that fundamentalism is a reductionist approach to 
religion. This heuristic (or “gnostic”) use of religious language 
and images is more common than one might think. It corresponds to 
what Bernard Stiegler (and Gilbert Simondon, and Carl Jung) calls 
individuation.
In the discussion of the cognitive status of religion it is 
difficult to maintain a balanced perspective. An interesting 
attempt is made in Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly’s Heideggerian 
treatment of both polytheism and monotheism as useful contemporary
ways of understanding the world and ourselves in ALL THINGS 
SHINING. Their account of religious language is “existential” and 
so situates religion as having a certain sort of cognitive 
function, but still maintains it as incommensurable with the type 
of referential cognition which characterises natural science. 
Religion is seen as incarnating a type of understanding of the 
world that is radically different from, and so unable to 
contradict or be contradicted by, or even enter into conflict 
with, the natural sciences. It is at this price of the referential
neutralisation of religion that they can employ it positively to 
fulfil their program: to lure back the shining things, to lure 
back the gods, “to find meaning in a secular age”.
Similarly, both Bruno Latour and Paul Feyerabend give accounts of 
religion that, in related but different ways, remove it from its 
customary opposition with secularism. For Latour religion is one 
“régime of enunciation” or “mode of existence” among others, with 
its own “conditions of felicity”, aimed at transformation rather 
than information. Feyerabend extends Latour’s view of religious 
traditions as different in kind from secular traditions, by 
nevertheless insisting that as raw materials they can be of use in
secular traditions such as the sciences or may even be employed to
correct (or at least to relativise)the one-sidedness of these 
traditions. This is where Feyerabend goes further than Latour. 
Latour “protects” religion from the accusation of, for example, 
scientific insufficiency or political violence. These sorts of 
accusations amount to criteria of the demarcation of religion 
from, and its subordination to, some other instance (very often 
science) supposed to be free from violence and cognitively more 
reliable. Latour makes this sort of move impossible by claiming 
that religion is so different that it is “not even 
incommensurable” with referential régimes such as science: 
http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/86-FREEZE-RELIGION-
GB.pdf.
Feyerabend recognises a possible qualitative difference between 
religion and straight referential traditions in that it includes a
performative aspect, but not, he argues to the detriment of a 
referential cognitive aspect. So the apparent difference in kind 
is due to the greater completeness of religious traditions as 
compared to (most) secular traditions. He is willing to add that 
in fact, but unbeknownst to them and so in truncated form, secular
traditions have this performative aspect too.
Feyerabend is classically deconstructive here, accepting initially
a binary demarcation (science/religion) to go on to re-valorise 
the weaker term (in rationalist discussions this is often 
religion), to then efface the demarcation and leave a more complex
and more ambiguous situation (complexity and ambiguity being terms
that Feyerabend uses to describe his own “deconstructive” strategy
– Feyerabend explicitly compares his arguments to deconstruction, 
though he declares that he prefers “Nestroy, who was a great, 
popular and funny deconstructeur, while Derrida, for all his good 
intentions, can’t even tell a good story”). Latour is certainly 
funnier and more popular in style than Derrida, but I find that 
there is something protectionist about his humour.
LATOUR, FEYERABEND, DELEUZE: CORRECTING A REVISIONIST HISTORY
Bruno Latour is complicit in the effacing or the downplaying of 
the ideas and influence of the previous generation of Continental 
philosophers (and I include Feyerabend in this category, alongside
Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault) and their role in 
inspiring, or even often anticipating, his own ideas. He gives the
same biased view of philosophical history as Meillassoux and OOO 
in which correlationism and the flight from realism continued 
through most of the last half of the 20th Century, and in which 
the "new" realists bring us what was lacking in deconstruction and
poststructuralism, and so take a decisive step forward. Rather 
than acknowledging a very real, and in fact massive, debt to 
Feyerabend, Deleuze, et al., he misrepresents and denigrates their
contributions, and prefers to reach even further back to Tarde, 
James, Whitehead, and Souriau to mystify those who are too young 
or too credulous to detect the Orwellian rewriting of the recent 
past that he often engages in.
In a recent interview (2012), discussing his own methodology, 
Latour affirms “this a thing that I learned from the “scientists” 
I studied, i.e. that: “Anything goes as long as it leads to what 
you want to find”. Just as in a laboratory you have instruments of
all sorts, including the most archaic and the most contemporary, 
because that is what is necessary in production, I myself have 
learnt a lot from “true” scientists, hard scientists, i.e. total 
indifference to questions of method” (page 123, my translation). 
This is very exactly what Feyerabend proposes in AGAINST METHOD 
(already in the essay version published in 1971), and Latour seems
to be guilty of a little “creative forgetting” here. He continues 
for two and a half pages (!) on the same theme, applying this 
notion it to his own work, and concludes, once again echoing 
Feyerabend without deigning to cite him: “So, how do you produce 
objects that resist what is said of them?, well, anything goes” 
(126).
Contrary to the repeated attempts (with which Latour himself is 
complicit) to associate Feyerabend with a naive espousal of chaos 
and anarchy, Feyerabend emphasised that we need both tenacity and 
proliferation, rules and their heuristic suspension, order and 
chaos, speculation and testability. He condemned the “naive 
anarchism” of no rules, he disliked chaos but claimed to have made
creative use of it in certain contexts, and he rejected the 
dogmatism of the traditional anarchists along with their 
scientism. Feyerabend wanted more responsibility, not less, and 
proposed that all those concerned, in citizen assemblies, should 
decide on what ontologies, theories, methods to apply – and not 
just the experts.
Feyerabend’s anarchism is “epistemological” precisely because he 
wants to get away from the need to posit a dogmatic “anarchist” 
method. Feyerabend explains that he did propose such a dogmatic 
anarchism for science in the early 60s, but then the encounter 
with the needs of the practicing scientist, and later the 
encounter with the needs of the more diverse population of 
students that were enrolled after more democratic education 
policies were adopted in the US (at the end of the 60s), led him 
to reject even the most open set of rules as long as they were 
meant to be applied universally instead of as rules of thumb. This
is similar to Latour's evolution from the methodological anarchism
that he espouses above to his later concerns with democractic 
assemblages.
Aside from the need to diffuse a smokescreen around certain key 
but disturbing influences, such as Feyerabend and Deleuze, whose 
explicit acknowledgement could get him into trouble in his search 
for a consensual surface, we cannot ignore Latour's rhetorical, or
"diplomatic", strategy of adapting his presentation to the 
auditory. To the English-speaking world familiar with Feyerabend’s
epistemology he makes a political critique, accusing him of 
"anarchism" (ignoring that Feyerabend’s later name for his 
position was “democratic relativism”). To a French politicist 
interviewer he comes out with a defence of exactly the sort of 
epistemological anarchism (“anything goes”) that Feyerabend 
defended decades before Latour. Feyerabend himself does not take 
credit for this idea, stating that he heard Popper defending it in
the 1940s. Latour does not mention this point, preferring in the 
interview to affirm that Popper makes no real contribution to the 
study of science, but is a political thinker hiding behind an 
epistemological mask.
On the whole question of methodological anarchism versus 
epistemological anarchism Feyerabend is quite clear that Popper 
was advocating methodological anarchism, the idea that there was 
no fixed method for science other than what worked or was 
appropriate in a specific case, in the 40s. Already Feyerabend 
agreed, but thought it was a banality, as his friends in the Kraft
Circle took this methodological anarchism for granted. The 
problem, as Feyerabend later came to realise, was that this 
methodological anarchism is basically incompatible with taking 
science as a preconstituted object, and so he argued that Popper’s
more specific methodological suggestions were a case of circular 
reasoning. Popper, he claimed, presupposes the very instances of 
good science (eg Newton, Maxwell, Einstein) that his criteria are 
supposed to neutrally select out. In fact the criteria are 
generalisations made from a partisan set of pre-decided instances,
and not the other way around. This is the difference, at least in 
Feyerabend’s work, between methodological anarchism applied inside
the pre-constituted and pre-demarcated sciences, and Feyerabend’s 
epistemological anarchism (circa 1966) which puts that demarcation
totally up for grabs and argues for all sorts of transversal 
composites as necessary for what we commonly think of as 
scientific progress.
Contrary to Latour's attempts to depict Feyerabend, and the whole 
of the post-'68 generation, as caught in negativity and critique, 
it must be emphasised that Latour’s starting point was in 
religious exegesis, and it is he who has expressed sadness at the 
disappearance of this mode of existence. Feyerabend’s starting 
point was aesthetic (opera and theatre) and scientific, and at the
end of his life he expressed the satisfaction that he “was never 
hindered in anything”, and that he had finally come to the 
maturity of being capable of loving another person (Grazia). In 
his autobiography Feyerabend describes in a concrete and personal 
way his progressive steps towards such love, whereas Latour talks 
about an abstract phenomenon of “conversion” as an all-or-none 
point-like experience in his book on religion, REJOICING. So I 
think that Latour is the more abstract thinker, and the true 
disappointed nostalgic. He is caught in the contradiction of 
pretending to be a descriptive anthropologist of the modern and 
yet including in his empirical description, out of nostalgia, a 
mode of existence that he claims has disappeared.
On the technical side of his epistemology, Latour is often guilty 
of making naïve empiricist statements and moves despite his 
seeming sophistication in other passages. His attempted 
universalising of so-called “empirical” observations, are far more
theory-laden and value-laden than he is often willing to take into
account. This is one of my major criticisms of AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODES OF EXISTENCE: the whole project is formulated in naïve 
empiricist terms, despite his meta-theoretical reflections on a 
“second empiricism”. This gets him caught in a set of pragmatic 
contradictions that Feyerabend never fell into.
Another disturbing feature of Latour's proclamations is his 
emphasis of the key advance his system makes in overcoming the 
subject/object dichotomy. This claim to radical progress over the 
recent past is ludicrous to anyone who knows the even slightest 
bit about the philosophies of Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, and 
Foucault. However, it may be of use to consider the absurdity of 
this claim in relation to the development of post-positivist 
epistemology. Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism does not 
presuppose subjects facing objects. From the very beginning in the
early 50s Feyerabend was influenced by Wittgenstein, and 
considered scientific statements as part of non-subjective 
language-games. He was also influenced by Popper, who later 
summarised his position in 1967 in a paper called “Epistemology 
Without a Knowing Subject”. The whole Popperian tradition 
elaborated such an epistemology outside the subject-object face-
off, as did the Quinean and the Wittgensteinian traditions in 
their own ways.
The subject-object face-off just has nothing to do with this whole
decades long evolution of Anglophone epistemology, and Latour 
shows either his ignorance or his incomprehension of the treatment
of these questions in the English-speaking world. Whatever his 
other faults, Popper broke decisively with this epistemology of 
the knowing subject and Latour cannot wish it away to create a 
void between himself and Whitehead. Feyerabend in the essay 
version of AGAINST METHOD (1971) was already presenting the 
subject as a collective assemblage entangled with other 
assemblages, a relay station for the passage of various forces, 
influences, processes and events. This analysis is blindingly 
obvious in his treatment of the Homeric cosmology in the book 
AGAINST METHOD of 1975, where he declares that a more contemporary
version of this type of cosmology, that he endorses, can be traced
back to Ernst Mach.
Wittgenstein was a reader of William James and was influenced by 
him for his philosophy of psychology and his philosophy of 
religion, and there are strong pragmatic aspects to his general 
perspective. One of his big ideas was the folly of trying to think
“outside language games”. Another was a deepening of the notion of
philosophical grammar. (Feyerabend mentions how he derived his 
idea of incommensurability and theory change from the reading of 
the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS and he first expounded it in 1952
to a group of Wittgensteinians, who were unmoved, finding it 
rather obvious). I think that Latour is indebted to this positive 
legacy of Wittgenstein’s, and that talking about Ryle and Austin 
is yet another piece of misdirection Also Wittgenstein is a key 
reference for David Bloor and the strong programme of the 
sociology of knowledge, and so Latour is playing down his debt to 
the guiding figure of a programme that he learnt from and then 
rivalised with.
Why did Deleuze famously condemn Wittgenstein’s “legacy”? We must 
remember that in LOGIC OF SENSE Deleuze is quite eulogious of 
Wittgenstein for the idea of meaning as use, that he cited 
Wittgenstein's critique of Freud's mythology as a precursor of the
ideas developped in ANTI-OEDIPUS, and that in A THOUSAND PLATEAUS 
the important idea of “incorporeal transformations” is discussed 
in relation to the tradition of “linguistic” philosophy initiated 
by Wittgenstein. So Deleuze, as usual when evaluating a movement 
of thought, approved of the creation of concepts in this tradition
but disapproved of the conservatism of meaning and the policing of
language. Feyerabend, who admits to having been decisively 
influenced by Wittgenstein, has exactly the same attitude to the 
conformism of some of his successors. Latour, despite his 
conceptual innovations, is in danger of elaborating a new police 
of meaning in his will to establish the "felicity conditions" of 
the various modes of existence and to forbid illegitimate 
crossings.
Latour cannot claim to be establishing empirically what previous 
philosophers such as Feyerabend were only able to advance as 
speculation. He cannot affirm that Feyerabend does not examine the
specific ways in which science produces knowledge. This is false, 
the whole point of the historical case study of Galileo and of his
detailed studies of Bohr, are to indicate what procedures did in 
fact work to advance physics. True Feyerabend does not do 
laboratory studies, but noone ever said that laboratory studies 
are all there is to studying science; Latour’s philosophy of 
science is woefully derivative: his historico-semiotic study of 
Pasteur contributes no new epistemological ideas, and confirms 
Feyerabend's ideas derived from the study of Galileo. And it is 
woefully incomplete: he is doing intra-paradigmatic analyses of 
networks in LABORATORY LIFE, and is unable to deal with the actual
content of scientific theories except by taking a Feyerabendian 
turn (see preceding remark on the Pasteur studies). So the 
looking-at-specific-ways-science-produces-knowledge criterion does
not distinguish Feyerabend from Latour either. The only criterion 
that does is the “laboratory studies” criterion, but it is of 
limited value, and is not rich enough to deal with paradigm 
change; Latour does talk about paradigm-change in relation to 
Pasteur, but this is precisely NOT a laboratory study, but a 
historical case study of the same type that Feyerabend conducted 
on Galileo.
It would be erroneous to maintain that Feyerabend's case study of 
Galileo just leads him to conclude that “anything goes”. This is 
not at all true, and he proposes specific methods that Galileo 
used. His conclusions are by no means purely negative. Latour does
not engage with Feyerabend's actual views and arguments but with 
an empty cliché far removed from his actual texts.
The criticism of Feyerabend as an amusing Dadaist is a case in 
point. It is no acute remark of Latour’s, but is a crucial point 
advanced by Feyerabend himself. He describes himself as closer to 
the Dadaists. This is part of Feyerabend’s critique of political 
anarchism as being scientistic, dogmatic, indifferent to concrete 
human lives, based on resentment, and it is Feyerabend who accuses
anarchism of dogmatic flattening. He declares that the problem 
with naive anarchism is that it leaves the hegemonic reality in 
place (including the  subject-object bifurcation) and so is part 
of the same problem rather than the solution. Latour is merely 
parasiting Feyerabend’s own ideas here, relabeling them, and 
turning them against a fictitious Feyerabend who never existed.
Does Feyerabend leave all forms of knowledge undifferentiated from
each other? No, this is Latour’s problem in his actor-network 
phase, which many have recognised to be one of the most 
reductionist ontologies of science, and Latour says as much in his
new book. He says that the actor-network analysis always reduced 
everything to the same sort of explanation in terms of networks, 
and needs to be supplemented and pluralised by his new theory of 
modes of existence. Feyerabend too fell into that sort of 
undifferentiated theorising in the early 60s, expounding a sort of
radicalised Popperian universal pluralist methodology covering 
art, science, religion, myth etc. But he broke with that at the 
end of the 60s, thanks to his Machian and Wittgensteinian 
inheritance.
Feyerabend spent much time analysing the typological distinctions 
between different sorts of cosmologies. He distinguished between 
cosmology A type traditions (e.g. Homer and Mach) and cosmology B 
type (Xenophanes and Popper). In CONQUEST OF ABUNDANCE he 
distinguishes between Homeric, Judaic, and Rationalist traditions 
and inside science itself Einsteinian and Bohrian traditions. His 
typology is different from Latour’s but he is emphatic that we do 
need a typology. Latour does not differentiate inside science, as 
he assigns it all to the one mode, that of reference. But 
reference for Feyerabend is too abstract and globalising a 
category, and he considers it a retrospective product of science 
in the making. Latour talks about studying science in the making, 
but this notion of reference does not distinguish between 
intraparadigmatic science where reference makes sense, and inter-
paradigmatic science where reference is constructed post hoc.
Curiously, Deleuze and Guattari, who elaborate their own typology 
of modes of existence in WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?, share with Latour 
this characterisation of science as reducible to the mode of 
reference. In this they seem to gloss over the difference that 
they made in A THOUSAND PLATEAUS between royal science and nomad 
science. The later forgetting of this distinction and the sharp 
demarcation that they make between science and philosophy, on the 
basis of the criterion of belonging to the mode of existence of 
reference, is excessive. If reference is constituted post hoc then
it cannot serve to identify science in the making (i.e. pro hoc) 
but only science made.
On this point it is Latour who makes a better move in an article 
in French on Pasteur (http://www.bruno-latour.fr/fr/node/232). He 
refers to the actors in the history of fermentation (Pasteur, 
yeasts, lactic acid etc.) as “conceptual personas”. He is clearly 
making use of the Deleuzoguattarianian concept without respecting 
the demarcation that they set up between philosophy and science. 
Curiously this reference is omitted in the English translation, 
thus rendering it once again more difficult to locate the 
Deleuzian influences on Latour’s ideas.
LATOUR AND WHITEHEAD: A PRAGMATIC ALLIANCE
Is Whitehead a key influence on the formation of Latour's thought?
The question can be posed because, despite Latour's increasing 
number of references to Whitehead's work and and to his importance
as a philosopher, the essential ideas of his project seem to 
predate his engagement with Whitehead's work and concepts. In a 
seminar (at approximately 31 mins) devoted to IRREDUCTIONS Latour 
tells us that he had no real knowledge of Whitehead at the time of
writing this treatise, but that he became a Whiteheadian only 
later, through his discussions with Isabelle Stengers.
I am not at all hostile to drawing a connection Latour and 
Whitehead. When I was very young (15-17) I read Whitehead with 
much pleasure, although I probably didn’t understand very much. 
Later I read Feyerabend, who became for a while my favorite 
philosopher. I am convinced that there are important similarities 
between Feyerabend’s ideas and Whitehead’s, but I don’t think that
there was any influence, more’s the pity. So while I am willing to
acknowledge a resemblance between Latour and Whitehead, I am 
dubious about the post hoc stories of influence that he recounts. 
I am willing to go so far as to admit that Latour is best 
understood against a Whiteheadian backdrop, but I find that he is 
rewriting his past on the basis of his present, and thus 
falsifying a little.
More generally I don’t think one should confuse the order of 
rational reconstruction (rhetorical order) with the order of 
discovery (heuristic order). Similarity (e.g. between Latour and 
Whitehead), or even eulogistic referencing, is not the same as 
influence. At the beginning of this blog, I discuss ALL THINGS 
SHINING, which I maintain is a pluralist treatise on modes of 
existence. Under the influence of Shaviro’s book on Whitehead, 
which contrasts very sharply the problematic of Heidegger and that
of Whitehead, I undertook to rewrite the ontological basis of ATS.
I did so because I thought that such a pluralist endeavour is best
understood in Whiteheadian terms, rather than, as they themselves 
understand it, in Heideggerian terms. I wrote several posts in 
this line, but I eventually abandoned it because I realised that 
Dreyfus and Kelly had managed to “bend” Heidegger in a pluralist 
pragmatist direction, compatible with Whitehead. I realised that 
thanks to their real innovations the differences between Heidegger
and Whitehead on a classical reading of the two philosophers was 
no longer an interesting question.
I bought into this sort of dichotomy over 3 years ago (in my case 
the dichotomy between Heidegger and Whitehead as ontological 
precursors to ALL THINGS SHINING), but I abandoned it very quickly
as being too simplistic and ultimately futile. Latour is French 
and came to intellectual maturity without having read the great 
classics of of the pragmatist tradition. During the 60s many 
important thinkers (Deleuze, Guattari, Lyotard, Foucault, Edgar 
Morin, Kostas Axelos and many others) had abandoned the subject-
object bifurcation and epistemologies of demarcation, and came to 
espouse various forms of semiotics and of enunciative linguistics.
The origins of Latour's ideas are best understood in the light of 
this milieu. Every page of Latour is redolent of Greimas and 
Serres and Deleuze and Foucault and Lyotard.
I do not think that Latour’s “public statements” of influence are 
to be taken at face value, but are more to be seen in the 
perspective of provisional alliance than in terms of filiation. 
Conceptual resemblance does not constitute proof of filiation (my 
example of Feyerabend o illustrates that). The most substantial 
textual convergence between Latour and Whitehead is in an article 
where he reformulates the findings of THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE
post hoc in Whiteheadian terms. Latour’s philosophy of science at 
the time of  THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE and IRREDUCTIONS (1984) 
is a transcription of the Deleuzian and Foucauldian Nietzsche 
reworked by Greimasian semiotics. Even on this point the idea of 
applying semiotics not just to texts but to things is a 
Nietzschean inspired one. since for Nietzsche all things as will 
to power interpret and evalue the world. Latour has declared that 
at the time he was not acquainted with Tarde, Whitehead, or 
William James, and so was obliged to make do with the conceptual 
resources available to him.
In a paper drawing the philosophical conclusions from his study of
Pasteur, and intent on overcoming the opposition between realism 
and constructivism, he declares that it is the reading of 
Whitehead that permitted him to overcome this opposition: “Before 
reading Whitehead, I could not extricate myself from this dilemma”
(13). Here Latour is referring to an event in his personal 
intellectual history, reading Whitehead, which was necessary for 
him to arrive at a solution.
However, the original French version does not contain this 
sentence, but a slightly different one: “Avant Whitehead, nous ne 
pouvions nous sortir de ce dilemme” (10) . “Before Whitehead, we 
couldn’t get out of this dilemma.” Here there is no reference to 
Latour’s reading but to intellectual history. Whitehead is said to
have created the conditions for leaving the dichotomy behind. 
Latour may have found the solution directly in Whitehead or in a 
later thinker, the biographical question is left open.
Strangely, an earlier account of the same work does not mention 
Whitehead at all, but attributes the role of guide to exiting the 
dichotomy to the semiotician Greimas: “This freedom in selecting 
actors and redistributing properties among them is crucial to 
understanding scientific practice, and, to my knowledge, no other 
discipline possesses that freedom. All the others have to start 
from a “natural” division between human and nonhuman properties” 
(3).
My conclusion is not however that the “real” debt is to Greimas 
and that the more recent references to Whitehead are a mere 
pedagogical or diplomatic device. Nor do I conclude that Greimas 
allowed him to get close to an insight that only the decisive 
influence of Whitehead crystallised into a “real” solution. That 
would be a pre-Latourian naïveté. Latour himself provides the more
appropriate conclusion:
    There are mediators all the way down, and adding sources will 
only add more mediations, none of them being reducible to mere 
“document”or”information.”
Deleuze, Greimas, Derrida, Whitehead, William James, etc. are all 
“mediators” permitting Latour to express his ideas now from one 
angle now from another, first to one public and then to another.
There is a deep resemblance between the systems of Latour and 
Whitehead but I think that the terminological borrowings do not 
reflect a major debt . Latour's more recent discussions of the 
need to overcome the bifurcation of Nature are a weak point in his
argumentation. They critique a straw man, a naïve empiricism, 
while not managing to hide Latour's own the naïve empiricist 
presuppositions. If this is a major influence of Whitehead on 
Latour it’s a bad one, but I think it’s mainly window dressing and
anxiety of influence.
Latour read Deleuze long before he read Whitehead, and the 
critique of the bifurcation of Nature is everywhere in Deleuze, 
e.g. the first few pages of ANTI-OEDIPUS, which Latour read before
undertaking the work leading to the writing of LABORATORY LIFE. 
IRREDUCTIONS is a direct transposition of Deleuze’s NIETZSCHE, 
“network” is the “rhizome”, everything is “assemblages”, 
“constructivism” is from A THOUSAND PLATEAUX, “modes of existence”
from Deleuze's writings on Spinoza and Nietzsche. The 
terminological and conceptual resemblances are massive, and very 
prior to Latour's encounter with Whitehead. I don't think one 
should downplay the convergence with Whitehead, but I don’t think 
the reading of Whitehead was a more important formative influence 
than the study of Deleuze.
FROM SEMIOTICS TO ONTOLOGY
1) RELIGION AND THE ENUNCIATIVE TURN: The origins of Latour's 
hypothesis of multiple régimes of truth  go back to his work on 
Biblical exegesis, as he declares repeatedly. The principle 
theoretical influences there seem to be Bultmann and Péguy. This 
is where Latour came to a "positive and constructive" reading of 
Bultmann's chains of translation" ("Coming out as a Philosopher").
Far from coming to a sceptical conclusion about religion, Latour 
concludes that the long chain of mediations is the condition of 
the truth of religious enunciation. This is a singular bifurcation
point: Latour conceives of religion as a specific régime of 
enunciation, a move which many have made. He argues that "belief" 
is not a pertinent category for this régime, nor is reference, 
which he will assign to factual knowledge. Yet despite abandoning 
belief, knowledge, reference and facts as non-pertinent, he 
retains the notion of "truth", and regards religious expressions 
as belonging not just to a specific régime of enunciation, but to 
a régime of truth or of "veridiction". This may be where Latour 
became interested in Greimas's semiotics. I think that this 
separation of truth and reference created a gap in Latour's system
that Greimasian semiotics did not really fill, and that this is a 
big part of the reason for the later move to Whitehead. Seeing 
things as themselves enunciations in the mode of reproduction 
allowed Latour to semiotise everything without reducing everything
to language.
2) SCIENCE AND THE SEMIOTIC TURN: Latour's beginning engagement 
with science, including LABORATORY LIFE and right up to 
IRREDUCTIONS, is best understood against a background composed of 
Deleuze-Serres-Lyotard-Foucault-Derrida and a sort of generalised 
Nietzscheanism and anti-Hegelianism. The engagement with networks 
of reference was facilitated by the Greimasian paradigm of 
semiotics that allowed Latour to treat human's and non-humans on 
the same plane. This permitted him to view the historicity of 
knowledge as at the same time a historicity of facts. This is the 
phase that Latour calls "historico-semiotic" and "socio-semiotic" 
("Biography of an Investigation").
3) MATERIAL ENTITIES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL TURN: Latour's 
discussions with Isabelle Stengers led to an "epiphany" in 1987. 
Constantly in danger of falling into a form of semiotic 
reductionism, Latour seized on Whitehead's descriptions of the 
"risk" of involved in persisting in being, even by rocks. This is 
where Latour's semiotic pluralism becomes veritably an ontological
pluralism, and the contribution of Whitehead's thought was 
decisive. In one sense the contribution is minor, the addition of 
a fifth mode (the mode of reproduction) after the four first modes
that Latour had already isolated (religion, reference, technology,
and double-click). At the same time this Whiteheadian encounter 
led to a real bifurcation on Latour's intellectual path, that has 
grown wider ever since. His first reaction was to write up the 
modes he had discovered in a little text called "Petite 
philosophie de l'énonciation" ("Little philosophy of enunciation",
written according to Latour in 1988 but published in 1998). It is 
interesting to note that the title still gives key place to the 
semiotic register of régimes of enunciation, but that this is the 
seed of the project that will give rise to AN INQUIRY INTO MODES 
OF EXISTENCE which features in the title the ontological register.
METHOD: ONTOLOGICAL ASCENT AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCENT
Latour’s movement is initially phenomenological. He attempts to 
get away from the abstraction of the subject-object division and 
to come back to both historical and individual experience. Only 
then can he rise to more “cosmological” concerns. In the case of 
the  beings of metamorphosis (Chapter 7) he begins with a 
historical survey of the West's treatment of superstition, the 
"irrational" belief in magical forces, occult powers, and 
invisible beings. Noting the rampant psychologization of our 
society, its massive use of psychotropic drugs, and its 
fascination with the fantastic in books, films, and tv series, he 
sees a contradiction between our anxious avoidance and persistent 
denial of the literal existence of these metamorphic beings on the
one hand, and our readiness to expose ourselves to them in 
situations that treat them as mere "subjective" phenomena on the 
other.
To come to grips with their ontological status outside this 
protective framing in terms of subjectivization,  Latour turns to 
a description of the "original experience" that permits us to 
define their mode of existence, which he takes to be the 
phenomenon of emotion and moods. Rejecting the premise of this 
subjectivization, that treats emotions as mere "inner" phenomena, 
he remarks that our experience is of something from outside us. 
Rather than being confined to our interiority, emotions, on 
Latour's hypothesis, are key elements in the networks that produce
this interiority. These "psychogenic" networks include many sorts 
of  material elements such as drugs and the pharmaceutical 
industry, books, shows, films and the entertainment industry, 
family arrangements, and therapeutic arrangements.
We may note that Latour's description of the "original experience"
of emotion presents it as always embedded in an imaginative or 
fantasy context. He uses a language of energies, forces, powers, 
metamorphoses and transmutations. He invokes the experience of 
dreams, the "subtle atmosphere of...moods", the depictions of 
mythology and the manifestations of ritual. This whole chapter is 
a defence of psyche against the reductions of psychologization. 
Rational psychology, including Freudian psychoanalysis, is 
presented as a compendium of self-misunderstandings.
Latour argues towards the end of this chapter that we may consider
that psychogenic metamorphosis is only one part of the metamorphic
mode of existence, to which he attributes universal extension: 
“Everything can, everything must, become something else” (203). In
doing so, he elevates it to a cosmogenic principle on a par with 
[rep], the persistence in being. However this universality is only
a speculative “hypothesis” inspired by the cosmological status 
that other collectives give to these beings. At the end he 
descends once again to modern subjectivity, our experience of 
emotions, and our interaction with invisible existents.
Latour calls his project “empirical metaphysics” and I see this 
same movement of descent, elevation, and redescent everywhere in 
the book. Starting off from some historical and social 
generalities he descends to the “original experience” 
(empiricism), the privileged or paradigmatic example. Doing the 
phenomenology of this lets him extract the form of veridiction 
(with its felicity conditions) appropriate to the beings involved 
and lets him rise to the determination of their mode of existence.
This ontological determination lets him descend again to 
experience, but this time finding the beings in question all 
through experience, and not just confined to the paradigm case he 
began with.
In theory, the phenomenology of the original experience has 
primacy, yet the book as philosophy is a speculative 
reconceptualisation of experience. So the tidy methodological 
sequence from experience to speculation and back to experience 
seems, at least some of the time, to be a fable hiding a quite 
different sequence where the speculation, guided by prior 
commitments, selects and characterises the experience that it will
later, in the fable, claim merely to describe and to generalise. 
Latour's talk of “empiricism”serves to blur or to cover over these
methodological problems rather than resolving them.
COMPARISON WITH FEYERABEND
In an interview (2012), discussing his own methodology, Latour 
affirms:
    “this a thing that I learned from the “scientists” I studied, 
i.e. that: “Anything goes as long as it leads to what you want to 
find”. Just as in a laboratory you have instruments of all sorts, 
including the most archaic and the most contemporary, because that
is what is necessary in production, I myself have learnt a lot 
from “true” scientists, hard scientists, i.e. total indifference 
to questions of method” (page 123, my translation).
This is very exactly what Feyerabend proposes in AGAINST METHOD 
(already in the essay version published in 1971). Latour continues
in the same vein for two and a half pages, applying this notion of
epistemological anarchism to his own work, and concludes: “So, how
do you produce objects that resist what is said of them?, well, 
anything goes” (126).
As in the case of Feyerabend's philosophy, epistemological 
anarchism is explicitly tied to a thesis of realism: the goal is 
to produce objects that "resist what is said of them". This 
anarchism is “epistemological” precisely because Feyerabend wants 
to get away from the need to posit a dogmatic “anarchist” method 
that has to be applied in every case. He explains that he did 
propose such a dogmatic anarchism for science in the early 60s, 
but then the encounter with the needs of the practicing scientist,
and later the encounter with the needs of the more diverse 
population of students that were enrolled after more democratic 
education policies were adopted in the US (at the end of the 60s),
led him to reject even the most open set of rules as long as they 
were supposed to be applied dogmatically as fixed, universal, and 
binding principles, instead of heuristically as variable, local, 
suggestions or rules of thumb. This is similar to Latour’s 
intellectual evolution from the methodological anarchism that he 
espouses above to his later concerns with composing democractic 
assemblages.
This evolution from methodological anarchism to democratic 
pluralism parallels the progression in Feyerabend’s work from his 
Popperian methodological anarchism applied inside the pre-
constituted and pre-demarcated sciences to his epistemological 
anarchism (circa 1966) which puts that demarcation totally up for 
grabs and argues for all sorts of transversal composites as 
necessary for what we commonly think of as scientific progress, 
and on to his democratic relativism as diplomatic guard rail for a
pluralist free society.
Latour tells us that this epistemological anarchist phase of his 
work, that can be seen in his actor-network phase were in danger 
of entrenching a hyper-reductionist approach. He argues that the 
actor-network analysis always reduces everything to the same sort 
of explanation in terms of networks, and needs to be supplemented 
and pluralised by his new theory of modes of existence. Feyerabend
too fell into that sort of undifferentiated theorising in the 
early 60s, expounding a sort of radicalised Popperian universal 
pluralist methodology covering art, science, religion, myth etc. 
But he broke with that at the end of the 60s, thanks to his 
Machian, Hegelian, and Wittgensteinian inheritance.
Feyerabend spent much time analysing the typological distinctions 
between different sorts of traditions and cosmologies. For 
example, in his last (unfinished) book CONQUEST OF ABUNDANCE he 
distinguishes between Homeric, Judaic, and Rationalist traditions,
and inside science itself between Einsteinian and Bohrian 
traditions. His typology is different from Latour’s but he is 
emphatic that we do need a typology to distinguish between 
different modes of existence, and between different forms of 
knowledge.
THE SPECTRE OF RELATIVISM
"We are witnessing today the struggle for intellectual hegemony --
for who will occupy the universal place of the “public 
intellectual” -- between postmodern-deconstructionist cultural 
studies and the cognitivist popularizers of “hard” sciences" 
(Zizek, “Lacan Between Cultural Studies And Cognitivism”).
Zizek proposes his own regressive solution to escape from this 
dichotomy: an imaginary Lacanism (that could be called "Lacan-Z") 
put together retrospectively to outflank both constructivism and 
cognitivism. The position elaborated in Zizek’s texts amounts to 
the combination of a poststructuralist approach (there is no meta-
language, the big Other does not exist) and of a regressive 
Freudo-Lacanian recoding of such ideas. Zizek takes deconstructive
and pluralist arguments and then retranscribes them backwards into
what he calls “Lacanese”. But this Lacan never existed, it is the 
necessary mask for Zizek’s own ideas, a heuristic fantasy.
Zizek wavers between poststructuralist pluralism and a monist 
reductionism founded on his idiosyncratic reading of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Despite the grand declarations, Zizek does not 
accomplish any break with and going beyond poststructuralism, 
rather his work represents its continuation . Unless one accepts 
his caricature of poststructuralism as an accurate description, in
which case it is no big thing to go beyond it.
This strategy of unavowed parasitic feeding on and 
misrepresentation of pluralist thought (when Zizek talks about 
postmodern, deconstructionist, or poststructuralist thought he is 
targeting the pluralist thought of Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard, and
Derrida) is no invention of Zizek's. Deleuze and Guattari argue 
convincingly that Lacan’s thought is a compromise formation 
between the monism of his predecessor Freud and various pluralist 
insights that he integrated to correct or to pluralise the system 
partially. So, like Freud, Lacan feeds on, without giving proper 
recognition to, the “other image of thought” that Deleuze 
explicitly links with the names of Nietzsche, William James, and 
Whitehead.
Discussing "pluralism" or the "pluralist" in general can be in 
itself a conceptually regressive gesture, creating the danger of 
conflating the pluralist with the relativist, or confusing 
pluralism with social constructionism. As these latter positions 
are relatively easy to refute, such conflations and confusions 
have a strategic rhetorical advantage: one can seem by hard-
hitting arguments to refute a whole gamut of positions and to be 
in the theoretical avant-garde, without giving oneself the trouble
to work through any really existing specific pluralist 
elaborations in detail. One may bray loudly about our fallibility 
and the need and importance of empirical tests to ensure our 
agreement with the real, without ever having confronted a real 
pluralist position to test one's arguments. As one has talked 
about noone in particular specific quotations contradicting the 
stereotyped analysis can be ignored, declared irrelavant, 
interpreted as saying the opposite of what they do indeed say, 
etc.
Thus to distinguish pluralism from its relativist shadow, we need 
to elaborate the concept of a realist pluralism both in abstract 
terms and also in relation to a concrete example of a pluralist 
thinker. The concrete example that we have been examining in this 
article is the pluralist metaphysics of Bruno Latour as it is 
expounded AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE. To conclude I wish 
to examine Latour’s contribution to an ontological (or realist) 
pluralism. 
# # #
LATOUR ON INVISIBLE ENTITIES: Relativist Tolerance or Ontological 
Pluralism?
Let us examine how Latour deals with the problem of superstition 
in his ontological treatise AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE. 
The general framework of the book is materialist in the sense that
the various modes of existence are embedded in material networks, 
and  that Latour regards the various relations that define and 
constitute these modes of existence as themselves material, 
existing with the same degree of material reality as the elements 
that are related. Latour poses a basic ontological principle that 
what is generated within and transits along these networks is not 
reducible to them. To take an epistemological example, knowledge 
is produced inside the material networks of reference but cannot 
be identified with them. To identify knowledge and its networks 
(i.e., in the case of science, laboratories, instruments, 
inscriptions, scientists themselves, and computer simulations, 
etc.) would be to commit a category mistake (naive reductionism). 
To separate off knowledge as existing in some other non-material 
realm would be another category mistake (Platonist idealism). The 
same can be said for the other "modes of existence" that Latour 
describes, on the principle that if all is material networks, what
is produced and transits in these networks can be qualitatively 
very different.
It is important to note that these distinctions have nothing to do
with "belief", but with an empirical and conceptual analysis of 
the various material networks. For Latour the people occupying a 
certain domain of practices may be totally mistaken not only in 
particular beliefs, but also globally in the type of existence 
that they attribute to the entities they deal with. For Latour 
there is no question of ontological tolerance being extended to 
every worldview, some are just plain wrong. This is the realist 
principle underlying his ontology. For example, fundamentalist 
Christians, in Latour's terms, are mistaken, they get the world 
wrong. The same can be said (and Latour says it often) about 
climate change denialists (they are wrong about science, they are 
wrong about climate change, the politics that they advocate would 
have disastrous consequences). Latour's pluralism is no wishy-
washy tolerant relativism, but a doctrine of combat.
Over and over again Latour emphasis the fallibility of our beliefs
and the need for objective tests. When he talks about 
"interpretive keys" characterising each mode of existence, this is
not beautiful soul relativism proclaiming "to each his belief". 
The key is a criterion that ensures that the claims and the 
practices can be put to the test, to be validated or rejected as 
compatible with the ongoing engagement with reality that each mode
embodies. The keys and the networks are the criteria that ensure 
that we are not infallible, each in his or her own world, and that
we are not reducible to our system of beliefs.
In Chapter 7 Latour applies this ontological pluralism to the 
"irrational superstitions" that are thought to characterise 
traditional societies. Enlightened modernity and its view of 
reason has been self-consciously constituted in terms of a battle 
against the superstitious belief in invisible beings and occult 
powers. The previous chapters of AN ENQUIRY INTO MODES OF 
EXISTENCE have shown that the Moderns are mistaken about the 
nature and composition of the visible world. For Latour there is 
no single“visible world”, the very idea is the result of a 
category mistake. Visibility is constructed and maintained in 
diverse material networks, and means different things in different
contexts, mobilising different equipment and standards.
According to Latour, we are not as homogeneously reasonable as we 
suppose. A suspicious symptom from our history is the overwhelming
violence that has accompanied the spread of Reason in the world, a
sign that we are anxious and frightened about the entities that we
nonetheless assert to be devoid of existence.The accusation made 
by the moderns against other cultures is that of their 
“irrationality” in their attribution of real existence to 
invisible beings. Not existing in the objective world, these 
beings in the eyes of the moderns can only be projections of the 
human psyche, the true locus of their existence. The only mode of 
existence that they can have is that of illusions and phantasms. 
These beings can only be explained in terms of the psychology of 
the inner world of subjectivity.
Applying his method Latour must search for material networks that 
are psychogenic, i.e. engaged in the production and maintenance of
psyches and subjectivities. The moderns that we are may have no 
positive institution for welcoming invisible beings, but we have 
an abundance of psycho-techniques and psycho-entertainment to 
stimulate, care for, or amuse ourselves. Our naïve, folk-
psychology, belief is that we do not produce our psyches but 
rather that we possess them. The self is supposed to be 
autonomous, independent of networks for its existence. There is no
meaning in the external world that is not projected by means of 
our internal representations.
In this ontological investigation into spirits, subjectivities and
psychic entities, traditional psychoanalysis cannot help us: 
according to Latour what is “repressed” is not just a part of the 
inner psyche that we project onto the outside world, confusing 
inner representations with outer entities. More fundamentally, 
what defines us is the ontological repression of the psychogenic 
networks that endow us with a psyche.
Our error is to attempt to think outside networks, to pay 
attention only to the “visible” products and to forget the 
invisible infrastructures. In consequence, we no longer know how 
(or where) to situate the subject and its "contents". Certainly 
not inside, as interiority is not a given, it is manufactured. Our
problem is one of attention, we do not notice the networks that 
engender the psyche. So we must return to the “original 
experience” of this mode of existence: emotion. Emotion is a form 
of crisis and transit, where our interiority is in the grip of 
what feels like an outside force. It invades us, takes possession 
of us for a certain time and carries us away, transforming our 
reactions, and then leaves us changed for better or worse.
The modern self is a contradictory relation between the belief in 
an autonomous authentic indvidual subject alone in an objective 
world devoid of meaning, and the swarm of entities that are 
actually necessary to its fabrication and continual modifications.
Caught in the repressive process of avoidance of these outside 
forces and of denial of their existence, the moderns have produced
a vast array of therapeutic arrangements authorising their 
acknowledgement as inner facts susceptible to various forms of 
manipulation.
Latour affirms that an ethnopsychiatric approach to therapeutic 
situations gives us the best insight into the existence of these 
invisible beings and into the skill needed in dealing with them. 
We already have such a skill constructed over our many contacts 
with these invisible beings. We know how to deviate and deflect 
their forces to other targets and gain their energy for going on 
in life. These beings can transform us, alientaing or inspring us 
in uncanny ways. They metamorphose themselves too, so this is why 
they are “invisible”, they do not have the persistence of the 
beings of reproduction, they do not belong to their régime of 
visibility and of stability. They do not inhabit the same 
networks. But they are real nonetheless.
Thus in Latour's system and in Tobie Nathan's practice these 
invisible beings are quite real, although perhaps not in the way 
that those who consciously believe in their existence may suppose.
Their scope is not just therapeutic but ontological, foregrounding
by means of their own proprties of metamorphosis and invisibility 
the alteration that characterises the form of ontological 
pluralism that Latour advocates, which he calls "being-as-other".
Latour acknowledges the existence of  invisible beings, of forces,
powers, divinities and demons that do not take us as unified 
persons; he emphasises the importance of psychic processes, of 
incorporeal metamorphoses, transformations, transmutations and 
becomings that oblige us to take being as alteration and 
repetition as difference. This is the language of affects and 
intensities that was developped by both Deleuze and Lyotard, but 
Latour does not give them ontological primacy, as Deleuze and 
Lyotard did at a certain moment. They constitute one mode of 
existence amongs many, and the pluriverse does not repose on this 
mode alone. Latour also breaks away the jargon-filled Freudo-
Marxist conceptual field that complicated this ontology and 
burdened it with a heavy-handed academic style. By renewing our 
theoretical vocabulary and references Latour has freed us from 
antiquated connotations and other dogmatic residues of the last 
century’s philosophical combats.
AGAINST THE OBJECTAL REDUCTION: LATOUR'S PLURALIST ONTOLOGY
Bruno Latour’s AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE provides us with
a host of categories other than object for describing what exists.
In particular, the dynamic aspect of matter is described in 
Chapter 7 under the category MET or “the beings of metamorphosis”.
Most of the chapter is focused on psychic entities, but at the end
he remarks that these beings “precede the human, infinitely” 
(203). It is clear that calling all existents “objects” is already
a reduction, and we need a more plural vocabulary.
On the question of the stability of objects, Latour has revealed 
that he found this problem particularly difficult. It was only 
after a conversation with Isabelle Stengers about Whitehead that 
he had an illumination that this stability was not universal, nor 
was it necessarily tied to humans. He conceived that it belonged 
to a specific mode of existence REP or reproduction, that ensures 
the persistence of beings.
Latour’s movement is to get away from the abstraction of the 
subject-object division and to come back to both historical and 
individual experience. On the basis of an ontological analysis of 
the phenomenology, he can then widen the import to more 
“cosmological” concerns. He makes it clear towards the end of the 
chapter we may consider that psychogenic metamorphosis is only one
part of the metamorphic mode of existence: “Everything can, 
everything must, become something else” (203). In doing so, he 
elevates it to a cosmogenic principle on a par with reproduction.
On this model the beings of reproduction are prior to the 
bifurcation of subject and object, and so prior to, but at the 
basis of, the constitution of objects stricto sensu by means of 
human categorisation. The interplay between persistence and 
alteration, or reproduction and metamorphosis, is the “musical” 
substrate for all other modes of existence which modulate this 
rhythmic composition of process and stability: “they form the 
basso continuo without which no music would be audible” (204).
However this universality is only a speculative “hypothesis” 
inspired by the cosmological status that other collectives give to
these beings. At the end he descends once again to modern 
subjectivity, our experience of emotions, and our interaction with
invisible existents.
Latour calls his project “empirical metaphysics” and I see this 
same movement of descent, elevation, and redescent everywhere in 
the book. Starting off from some historical and social 
generalities he descends to the “original experience” 
(empiricism), the privileged or paradigmatic example. Doing the 
phenomenology of this lets him extract the form of veridiction 
(with its felicity conditions) appropriate to the beings involved 
and lets him rise to the determination of their mode of existence.
This ontological determination lets him descend again to 
experience, but this time finding the beings in question present 
all through experience, and not just confined to the paradigm case
he began with.
ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM IS NOT RELATIVISM: THREE THESES
1) Against tolerance: Latour’s pluralism argues against climate 
change denialism
On this very interesting question one should read the numerous 
discussions of climate change denialism by Latour, who very 
intelligently outflanks the deniers, and shows that they have no 
research to back up their claims, that they are not credible 
“others” whose point of view is to be respected. Latour's 
pluralist ontology is not a universal relativism, as this very 
example proves. The Gifford lectures (Facing Gaia: Six lectures on
the political theology of nature) were very clear on this point. 
Also AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE opens on this question and
establishes Latour's rejection of such sceptical and relativist 
ploys as based on a totally inadequate view of science. There is 
no equivalence of value between the scientific view and pseudo-
scientific propaganda.
2)  Against “belief”: Latour's pluralism rejects fundamentalism as
erroneous 
It is important to note that the distinctions that Latour makes 
between the different modes of existence have nothing to do with 
“belief”, but are based on an empirical and conceptual analysis of
the various material networks that sustain them. For Latour the 
people occupying a certain domain of practices may be totally 
mistaken not only in particular beliefs, but also globally in the 
type of existence that they attribute to the entities they deal 
with. Such is the case of the Christian fundamentalist. There is 
no question of ontological tolerance being extended to every 
worldview and to every belief, some are just plain wrong. This is 
the realist principle underlying Latour's pluralist ontology.
Fundamentalist Christians, in Latour’s terms, are mistaken over 
many things, not just about their own religion: their 
preoccupation with belief as the defining feature of religion is 
wrong, their actual beliefs are false, their idea of reference to 
the world is wrong, and so Latour concludes that they get the 
world wrong. As we have seen, the same can be said (and Latour 
says it often) about climate change denialists (they are wrong 
about science, they are wrong about climate change, they are wrong
in the politics that they advocate, which would lead to disaster 
Latour’s pluralism is no wishy-washy tolerant relativism, but a 
doctrine of combat.
3) AGAINST EPISTEMIC IMMUNITY: Latour's pluralism argues for the 
fallibilism of our knowledge claims
Latour's pluralist ontology emphasises the fallibility of our 
beliefs and the need for objective tests. When he talks about 
“interpretive keys” characterising each mode of existence, this is
not beautiful soul relativism proclaiming “to each his belief”. 
Applying the wrong interpretive key is a category mistake, i.e. an
ontological error that results in false claims about the world. 
The key is a criterion that ensures that the claims and the 
practices can be put to the test of experience, and so to be 
validated or rejected as compatible or not with the ongoing 
engagement with reality that each mode embodies. Our ontological 
error is to attempt to think outside material networks and to 
ignore the need for the appropriate interpretative key. We tend to
pay attention only to certain detached propositions and to reified
products, and to forget the modes of existence and the material 
infrastructures. The keys and the networks are the criteria that 
ensure that it makes sense to try to get the world right, taking 
into account that our beliefs are not infallible, each in his or 
her own world, and that we ourselves are not reducible to our 
system of beliefs.
